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United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2410 (2018), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) until 15 April 2019 and requested me to report to the Council every 90 days on the implementation of the resolution. It covers major developments that have occurred since the issuance of my most recent report, on 30 August (S/2018/795), progress on the benchmarked exit strategy and an update on timelines for the transfer of tasks and responsibilities for handover to the Government, in coordination with the United Nations country team.

II. Major developments

A. Political developments

2. This reporting period was marked by incidents of volatility and tension, including calls for President Jovenel Moïse to step down. The two Senate commission reports of 2016 and 2017 on the mismanagement of the PetroCaribe Fund, which I detailed in my report of 20 March (S/2018/241), gave rise to widespread yet predominantly peaceful civil society demonstrations nationwide to demand greater transparency and accountability from the Government. As these protests unfolded, a civil society movement known as PetroCaribe Challenge emerged on social media in August, intensifying calls for a credible investigation and for the authorities to exert due diligence. While the movement was initially not politically affiliated, in September, the more extreme opposition parties joined the demonstrations. Online and on the streets, the rhetoric intensified and incidents of violence occurred in the capital, Port-au-Prince. The pressure continued to mount ahead of the 17 October commemoration of the assassination of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, a leader of the Haitian Revolution and the first ruler of an independent Haiti in 1804.

3. On 17 October, protesters took to the streets in considerable numbers in 31 locations across the country, with the biggest gathering occurring in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince (West region). As the day progressed, the initially peaceful demonstrations grew more tense and, in some instances, became violent, with widespread use of roadblocks and burning tyres. The violence was successfully contained by the national police and damage to property was limited. An estimated

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10,000 to 15,000 Haitians marched that day, the largest public demonstration in recent history. Most demands focused on the PetroCaribe Fund, and there were also calls for improved delivery of social services and for President Moïse to step down.

4. The national police reported that 2 civilians were killed and 24 injured, in addition to 19 national police officers. In addition, 46 people were arrested nationwide. Local media and politicians unanimously viewed the 17 October demonstrations as a success due to their relatively peaceful nature. International actors highlighted the professionalism of the police and the improved communications between the Government and police leadership.

5. The situation remained tense throughout the religious holiday weekend of 1 and 2 November. On 31 October, a combined funeral for six individuals, alleged to have died under various circumstances on 17 October in the Delmas 2 and Bel-Air neighbourhoods (Delmas, West region) was disrupted by shootings and road blocks, with many disturbances reported across the city. Later that day, 11 people were wounded by gunshots in the Village de Dieu area of Port-au-Prince, and a girl of 11 years of age was killed.

6. The 18 November commemorations of the 215th anniversary of the battle of Vertières (Cap-Haïtien, North region) were also marked by nationwide anti-corruption protests. In the country's main cities, demonstrations brought together relatively large crowds of people, albeit in smaller numbers than on 17 October. The protestors were notably different from the 17 October crowds, most of them being political militants echoing the calls of the opposition, with far fewer women present. Barricades of rocks and burning tyres erected by protesters were quickly cleared by the national police, and a small number of incidents were recorded. Authorities reported 6 people killed, 5 injured and 35 arrested. The leaders of the radical opposition party Secteur démocratique et populaire reported 11 people killed, 45 wounded and 75 arrested. The demonstrations were followed by a well-observed two-day general strike on 19 and 20 November.

7. President Moïse responded to the people's demands by asking that the Prime Minister provide all necessary support to the relevant institutions, specifically the justice system as it investigates the allegations regarding the mismanagement of the PetroCaribe funds. The President further emphasized that private companies found to have defrauded the State would be prosecuted, and he requested that all State officials involved in the management of the PetroCaribe funds make themselves available to the ongoing investigation.

8. On 22 October, amid growing allegations of mismanagement, President Moïse dismissed 18 close associates and advisers, including his chief of staff, who previously served as Economy and Finance Minister, citing the importance of government accountability. On the same day, Prime Minister Jean-Henry Céant announced the creation of an independent commission comprising national experts to oversee the PetroCaribe investigation and guarantee its political neutrality. However, since the announcement, national media associations, members of the PetroCaribe Challenge movement, human rights organizations and other entities mentioned by the Prime Minister as possible members of the commission publicly declined to participate.

9. Activity in Parliament was characterized by limited legislative activity in both chambers due to their failure to hold regular weekly plenary sessions. On 4 September, Parliament adopted the amended 2017–2018 budget, revised after fuel subsidies were reintroduced following violent unrest against the measure from 6 to 8 July. The revised budget forecasts a 10 per cent increase in spending, or approximately $150 million, together with a drop in fuel revenues of approximately $100 million. The draft law on the creation, organization and functioning of the National Council on Legal Aid, promulgated on 26 October, sets the legal framework

for access to legal advice for Haitians regardless of their social status. This long overdue piece of legislation represents an important milestone in the effort to reduce pretrial detention rates. The second ordinary session of the legislative year closed on 10 September, with 8 draft laws voted and transmitted to the executive for promulgation, bringing the year's total to 19. Following his appointment as Prime Minister on 5 August, Jean Henry Céant's cabinet received a vote of confidence in an extraordinary session of the National Assembly on 15 and 16 September.

10. The new Cabinet consists of 25 ministers, secretaries of state and delegate ministers, including 6 women. Women thus account for only 24 per cent of the Cabinet, which is lower than the 30 per cent minimum quota prescribed in the Constitution. The female ministers have been appointed to ministries traditionally occupied by women: Tourism, Haitians Living Abroad, Social Affairs and Labour, Public Health and Population, Women's Affairs and Women's Rights, and Human Rights and the Fight against Extreme Poverty, which seldom play a role in strategic government decision-making. The new Government includes six ministers and three state secretaries from the previous Government.

11. Despite the reappointment of the Minister of Justice and Public Security, relationships between the judiciary and the executive branches remained tense, resulting in delays in the appointment of judges. A total of 66 judges were appointed by the President during the period under review. Nonetheless, according to the Superior Council of the Judiciary, at least 70 more judges should be appointed to ensure that all courts are functioning normally. In parallel, since 11 October, the lawyers of the Port-au-Prince Bar Association launched a strike demanding the recall of the Port-au-Prince Public Prosecutor and the arrest of the West region director of the national police and other police officers accused of police brutality against lawyers.

B. Economic situation

12. Macroeconomic indicators continued to deteriorate during the reporting period. Failure to reform the fuel price subsidies weakened an already low domestic revenue mobilization, inducing a serious budget deficit as expenditures rose. By the end of August, fuel subsidies and transfers to the state electricity utility amounted to 2.2 per cent and 1.5 per cent of the gross domestic product, respectively, while spending on education and health combined represented 2.4 per cent. As a result, the budget deficit is now expected to reach 4 per cent of the gross domestic product. Inflation reached 14.1 per cent at the end August. The Haitian gourde's depreciation against the United States dollar continued, closing at a commercial exchange rate of 1 dollar to 73 gourdes by 22 October, a 10.4 per cent devaluation since October 2017.

C. Humanitarian situation

13. On 6 October 2018, an earthquake of 5.9 magnitude struck the northern part of Haiti, with the epicentre located about 20 kilometres north of Port-de-Paix (North-West region). According to the Directorate of Civil Protection, the earthquake caused 18 deaths, 548 wounded, destroyed 1,417 houses, damaged 9,717 houses and affected 11,134 families in the North-West, North and Artibonite regions. The affected population required shelter, kitchen, water, sanitation and hygiene kits. The Government mobilized its resources to assist the population.

14. In the immediate aftermath, the United Nations humanitarian agencies, jointly, and in support of the Directorate of Civil Protection, visited some of the affected areas to assess the damage and identify areas of potential support to national authorities. MINUJUSTH assisted national rescue efforts by supporting the national police in the

affected areas and through the deployment of its drone unit. In the wake of the earthquake, the Government announced the intention to create a permanent multisectoral crisis management mechanism under the leadership of the Prime Minister's office to improve coordination, including of humanitarian aid, in line with the Government's interest in a new paradigm for international assistance. The international community reiterated its long-standing support and continued commitment to investing in the strengthening of the Directorate of Civil Protection.

15. The United Nations continued to support the Haitian authorities' response to combat cholera under the umbrella of the national plan for the elimination of cholera. In a promising development, the number of cases did not increase significantly during the rainy season. Although suspected cholera cases continue to be reported throughout the country, new suspected cases nationwide dropped to an average of 46 cases weekly in September and the first week of October, compared to 301 weekly suspected cases during the same period in 2017. The suspected weekly caseload at the peak of the outbreak in 2010 was over 18,500.

16. Despite this progress, it is critical that the intensified cholera control efforts are maintained to continue saving lives and reducing the transmission of cholera in line with the targets set in the national plan. The rapid response teams from the Ministry of Public Health and Population, supported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), have been instrumental to the successes in fighting the disease. An early reduction in the number of response teams poses a risk that cholera might spread again. Under track 2 of the new United Nations approach to cholera, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is concluding local consultations in Mirebalais to provide material assistance to those most directly affected by the disease. UNDP and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), supported by the Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, UNICEF and MINUJUSTH, are preparing a follow-up to the pilot phase, to provide other severely affected communities with similar support.

17. Special attention continued to be given to reinforcing local capacities for emergency preparedness. On 6 October, with the support of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 30 health and protection experts from the final 3 of the 10 regions in the country completed the certification on the Minimum Initial Service Package for Reproductive Health in emergencies, bringing the total to 100 experts trained across the 10 regions.

18. According to the partial results of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification conducted in October 2018 in drought-affected areas, 5 per cent of the population analysed (145,078 people) are in an emergency phase, and 25 per cent (629,082 people) are in a crisis phase, representing approximately 30 per cent of the population analysed. Projections of the situation indicate that from October 2018 to February 2019, 774,159 people will be food insecure and in need of assistance.

19. The 2018 humanitarian response plan, which is aimed at reaching 2.2 million Haitians with humanitarian and protection assistance and requires $252.2 million, was only 11.2 per cent funded as at 23 November 2018.

20. On 20 September, the evaluation phase of the long overdue population and housing census in Haiti was finalized, marking the transition to the main phase. After more than 15 years, with the support of UNFPA, the census will provide a much needed update of the national database on demographics, socioeconomics, gender and housing conditions. These are essential for the country and the international community to establish new baselines for more effective and sustainable policies that save lives and ensure a more informed approach to helping Haiti eradicate extreme poverty and embrace the challenge of reaching the sustainable development goals.

III. Mandate implementation

21. As requested by the Council in its resolutions 2350 (2017) and 2410 (2018), MINUJUSTH established a mechanism to monitor progress in the implementation of its benchmarked two-year exit strategy and transition to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence. The data collection and analysis for the 46 indicators outlined in my previous report continue to be conducted in collaboration with the United Nations country team and national stakeholders, using the existing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework. This joint monitoring mechanism, which enhances the coordination of actions planned by MINUJUSTH and the United Nations country team in support of the Government, will further facilitate the transfer of tasks and responsibilities. The progress made during the reporting period is outlined in annex I to the present report.

22. Against the backdrop of demonstrations throughout the reporting period, and in view of the elections planned for the fourth quarter of 2019, MINUJUSTH continued to use its community violence reduction programme to mitigate pockets of violence in "hot spot" areas in Port-au-Prince and its outskirts. In fragile neighbourhoods affected by a lack of socioeconomic opportunities and limited access to basic services, including the police and justice systems, and prone to persistent gang violence, idle and disfranchised young men and women represent easy recruits who can be used to trigger violence in public protests to serve political and/or criminal interests. The programme involved community members, in particular at-risk youth and women living in the most marginalized neighbourhoods, in planning and implementing high labour-intensive and income-generating activities to stabilize and improve security in neighbourhoods under gang control.

23. MINUJUSTH initiated three separate community violence reduction projects, in Martissant and Carrefour-Feuille, southern neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, implemented by both national and international non-governmental organizations. Thus far, a total of 2,242 women and 2,058 men are enrolled in activities such as football tournaments, capacity-building for community leaders, neighbourhood-based dialogues to promote peace and access to education.

24. These initiatives, which offered temporary livelihood opportunities to youth, complemented the national police's security stabilization efforts by raising community awareness on security and rule of law issues as well as increasing community trust in the national police and rule of law institutions. For instance, in Port-au-Prince, internships and vocational training opportunities had been offered to 151 at-risk youth, in partnership with 70 local businesses, and in the Centre region, 288 young women and men from marginalized communities had participated in the construction of an agricultural road. The national police are now able to easily provide community policing services through activities undertaken within the framework of community violence reduction projects.

25. MINUJUSTH is also supporting the implementation of community violence reduction projects in the North, North-West and Centre regions, which focus on income-generating and highly labour-intensive activities. These include vocational and on-the-job training, capacity-building in small business management and support to direct beneficiaries for the development of income-generating activities. As at 7 November, 691 women and 599 men had taken part in those activities.

26. Increasing the understanding of the rule of law remains a key priority. Since 1 September, MINUJUSTH mobile teams, with funding from the community violence reduction programme, has supported seven conferences and town hall debates throughout the country to raise community awareness of the rule of law. A total of 23 such activities have been held thus far, in which more than 4,500 people, including

1,436 women, have participated. On the basis of assessments by mobile teams, 11 quick-impact projects were initiated to improve the facilities of rule of law institutions, including courts, prisons and police posts, as well as water treatment in prisons, toilet construction in detention cells and the construction of prison fences and watchtowers.

27. Under the joint rule of law programme, the Mission and the United Nations country team continued to support the rule of law institutions in line with the MINUJUSTH mandate. The programme helped to renovate and equip police stations, strengthened the case management system of the Inspector-General of the Haitian national police, and supported oversight and accountability bodies, such as the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Directorate of Prison Administration, the Office of the National Human Rights Ombudsperson, the Interministerial Committee on Human Rights and civil society, through the use of programmatic funding.

28. MINUJUSTH finalized its protection of civilians strategy and its second forward-looking assessment of threats to civilians covering the period October to December 2018, in consultation with humanitarian actors. These include human rights violations by the national police, violence resulting from gang activity and violence triggered by major civil unrest, massive deportation or the spontaneous return of Haitian migrants, and natural disasters.

A. Security and police developments (benchmarks 1, 4, 5 and 6)

29. There were 108 largely peaceful demonstrations related to the PetroCaribe Challenge movement during the reporting period, 23 of which were in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Data sourced from the national police shows that the rate of homicide had decreased 4.2 per cent since my previous report and, as at the time of publication of the present report, is now at 6.22 per 100,000 inhabitants, one of the lowest in the Caribbean region. Over half of these homicides occurred in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

30. The efforts by the national police to ensure the safety of the population continued to be operationally challenged by gangs operating in areas of the capital. Despite the commitment of the national police hierarchy to tackle gangs, neighbourhoods such as Martissant, which are densely crowded, pose significant impediments to improving the safety of a population that is suffering from poor socioeconomic opportunities and particularly vulnerable to criminality and insecurity. On at least two occasions, national police officers accompanied by a MINUJUSTH formed police unit were fired upon during patrols in gang-ridden neighbourhoods without sustaining injuries or damage.

31. During the planned demonstration on 17 October in Port-au-Prince, a group of violent demonstrators attempted to force entry into the World Bank and UNFPA offices, throwing stones and injuring a private security guard. Two surveillance cameras were also stolen. In Saint Marc (Artibonite), three United Nations formed police unit officers were injured by stones thrown at them, and seven police officers assigned to the public order unit suffered lacerations from stones in Cap-Haïtien. On 18 November, a small number of incidents were recorded.

32. The Mission provided operational support to the national police by participating in 290 joint temporary checkpoints, 528 foot patrols, 576 vehicle patrols and 5 joint police operations. The Mission also provided support in 12 crowd-control operations related to protests in Port-au-Prince and other cities. The national police specialized units continued to show progress in terms of operational planning, coordination and

compliance with principles on the use of force and respect of human rights as outlined in the national police strategic development plan for the period 2017–2021.

33. MINUJUSTH supported the national police in an operation conducted in Village de Dieu (southern Port-au-Prince, West region) in an attempt to regain control of the zone and capture a gang leader operating in that area. The operation, which took place on 3 November, mobilized 140 officers from national police specialized units. In addition to assisting in planning the operation, MINUJUSTH supported the police in securing and conducting surveillance of the perimeter with a drone unit, five formed police unit sections and armoured vehicles. A formed police unit armoured vehicle was shot at during an exchange of gunfire between the national police and gang members. No injuries were reported. The operation continued from 4 to 5 November, with an increased presence by the national police and MINUJUSTH formed police units in the area, in particular through patrols on Route Nationale 2 and inside Village de Dieu.

34. The national police strategic development plan for the period 2017–2021 has experienced a slow rate of implementation during its first year. Among the primary causes for the limited progress was the insufficient funding committed by the Government of Haiti and international donors. At the onset, the Haitian Government committed to cover 55 per cent of the funding of the five-year plan, but thus far has provided only 8 per cent of its required financial resources for the 2017–2018 fiscal period. Likewise, main donors have only contributed 15 per cent of their first-year financial commitment. This has resulted in some complex priority actions of the plan not being completed, with an overall implementation rate of 27.6 per cent for the first year and progress on 90 of the remaining 108 activities.

35. Since the adoption of the strategic development plan, a total of 42 infrastructure projects have been implemented, enabling the national police to increase their presence in the municipal sections. During the reporting period, 15 infrastructure projects in support of the national police were ongoing, 4 of which were financed by the Government of Haiti, 4 through the Mission quick-impact projects, 3 through the joint rule of law programme and 4 through bilateral cooperation. Increasing national police facilities across the country is a key aspect in ensuring the effective presence of the national police and reducing insecurity, but also for improving the working conditions of police officers.

36. Following the graduation on 19 September of 692 cadets, the total number of police officers nationwide increased to 15,735, including 1,568 women (10 per cent). This brings the police-officer-to-population ratio to 1.37 police officers per 1,000 inhabitants, which is still below the United Nations standard of 2.2 per 1,000. Nevertheless, this represents an important milestone in achieving the targeted ratio of 1.45, and at least 11 per cent of women, by October 2019. The percentage of police personnel deployed outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area has reached 34.2 per cent, a 4.5 per cent increase from my previous report. As part of the continued effort to increase the number of police officers, the national police announced that it had enrolled 658 applicants, including 132 women, for its 30th promotion, whose training should start before the end of 2018.

37. As part of the joint project by MINUJUSTH and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) to establish a gender-sensitive recruitment mechanism for the national police, activities are under way to identify marginalized communities in which young women will be encouraged to apply. Through its community violence reduction programme, the Mission also supported community mobilization against sexual and gender-based violence in the Artibonite, Grand'Anse and South regions. As at 20 November, 30 moderators from 15 local organizations carried out 59 sensitization sessions for 3,012 direct

beneficiaries, to raise awareness among the general population on sexual and gender-based violence and on reporting such cases.

38. The fourth international seminar on the fight against sexual and gender-based violence, organized jointly by the Mission and the national police, took place from 8 to 10 October at the Haitian National Police Academy in Port-au-Prince. My Special Representative, international speakers, prosecutors and various United Nations organizations and civil society in Haiti participated in the seminar. The topics included human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, including domestic violence, justice and the functioning of the penal chain, and victim protection. Likewise, with the goal of enhancing the capacity of the national police to prevent and investigate cases of sexual and gender-based violence, in November, three workshops were held in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince with key stakeholders in the penal system.

39. As requested in resolution 2410 (2018), preparations for the withdrawal of two formed police units in December are under way, with arrangements in place for the national police to take over residual operations where the United Nations presence will be reduced. The Mission will update the security transition plan in the coming weeks to provide information on the repatriation of other formed police units. The national police has committed to ensuring a smooth drawdown of the formed police units in 2019, through a continued assessment of the security situation across the country, in close coordination with the United Nations country team and international donors.

B. Justice (benchmarks 1, 2 and 5)

40. During the period under review, important progress was made on the legislative front, such as the promulgation of the legal aid law. On the institutional front, advances were made regarding the timely review of criminal cases and the commitment of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security to replicate the coordination mechanism of the Port-au-Prince jurisdiction nationwide. Prolonged pretrial detention rates persisted, particularly in jurisdictions with poor access to justice and where monitoring of the caseload of judges and prosecutors is weak.

41. As at 23 October, the proportion of detainees in pretrial detention in excess of two years was 63.6 per cent, compared to 61.1 per cent in the previous reporting period. To address this situation, several initiatives are being put in place. At the August meeting of the penal chain committee of Port-au-Prince, which brings together all rule of law actors on a monthly basis, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security took steps towards facilitating the delivery of the sentencing orders necessary for the release of convicted persons who had already completed their sentence. A ministerial committee is also being established to list inmates and their periods of detention, in order to identify those for whom detention is no longer justified.

42. During the same period, MINUJUSTH continued to provide technical support to four legal aid projects providing access to justice to vulnerable individuals financed by its community violence reduction programme. The two legal aid offices of the Port-au-Prince Bar Association opened 2,249 new cases, held 1,961 consultations, filed 100 habeas corpus requests and contributed to the release of 250 pretrial detainees during the reporting period. A third legal aid project started its activities at the centre for the re-education of minors in conflict with the law and created a registry of all 89 detained minors, with 54 cases opened and two workshops held for lawyers and judges to improve the handling of cases involving minors. Similarly, a pilot multidisciplinary legal aid project at the women's prison of Cabaret (West region),

launched by UN-Women in 2017, was expanded in September to provide legal assistance and psychosocial support to all the 258 women and girls in detention. The investigating judges issued 14 orders; nine releases were obtained through this project (after 5, 6, 7 and 11 months of extended detention, respectively).

43. In the Port-au-Prince jurisdiction, prosecutors, investigating judges and the court of first instance are on track to achieve the benchmarked indicators related to access to justice. Between October 2017 and September 2018, prosecutors received 1,080 penal cases. In 41 per cent of them (444 cases), the prosecution decided whether to present charges or to close the file the same day that the case was filed. In 43 per cent of those cases, processed in real time, charges were dropped. During the same period, investigating judges closed 365 files. During the 2017–2018 judicial year, the 22 investigating judges closed over 16 cases each, a yearly average of 1.3 cases per investigating judge per month. The court of first instance did not hold hearings during the reporting period, owing to judicial vacations between 30 June and 30 September.

44. The court of first instance and the court of appeal of Port-au-Prince have not been operational since 10 October when the Bar Association of Port-au-Prince decided to suspend the pleadings and blocked access to the courts. The lawyers are protesting violent responses by national police officers on 2, 4 and 9 October. They are also requesting that the chief public prosecutor be dismissed for not initiating legal proceedings. This situation is of concern and if not resolved could have a negative effect on the performance of these jurisdictions and that of the legal aid offices. Despite these developments, the court of first instance has adjudicated a total of 437 penal cases since October 2017.

45. A disagreement between the Superior Council of the Judiciary and the executive branch resurfaced during the reporting period. In an open letter to President Moïse dated 10 September, the Council warned of the negative impact that delays in the appointment of judges could have on the justice system. The Government noted that the delays were due to the conduct of thorough background checks and, on the eve of the start of the 2018 judicial year on 1 October, appointed 36 judges and, on 22 October, 30 more. On 30 August, the Senate launched a second call to fill vacant seats on the Cour de cassation on 30 August, as the partial list previously submitted to the Government would allow for only four of the six vacant seats to be filled.

46. In addition to the delays in the appointment of judges, the National Association of Magistrates threatened to go on strike if their request for a salary increase was not taken into consideration by the presidency. The recent ad interim appointment of Ocnam Clamé Daméus as the Director of the Directorate of Judicial Inspections of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, a position that has been vacant since April 2016, when it was created, raised some concerns in certain sectors of civil society, as he is the Superior Council councillor representing all prosecutors of the courts of first instance.

47. The adoption of the law on legal assistance by the legislative branch on 10 September and its promulgation on 26 October constituted a major step that will significantly improve access to justice. In order to create a framework for the implementation of the law, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security established a technical committee, to which MINUJUSTH is contributing. The Committee will support the Ministry in the diffusion and implementation of the law by developing an action plan and a budget and designing rules, regulations and application tools.

48. MINUJUSTH, in accordance with its mandate, has also continued its support to the control bodies of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Superior Council of the Judiciary to strengthen their oversight and discipline functions. MINUJUSTH provided assistance to the Ministry in its inspection services through a series of activities, to perform inspection missions, in the public prosecutor's offices

in the 18 courts of first instance and 5 courts of appeal during the judicial year 2018–2019. MINUJUSTH supported one workshop on performance indicators and inspection tools for prosecutors, held from 2 to 4 October, another one on the development plan of the judicial inspectorate, held on 10 and 11 October, and one on capacity-building and exchanges of experiences, held on 24 and 25 October. In addition, MINUJUSTH provided technical assistance and supported the directorate of the judicial inspectorate of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, for a five-day retreat, held from 8 to 12 October, on the careers and evaluation of magistrates.

49. In the framework of the joint rule of law programme, MINUJUSTH and UN-Women provided training on the impact of prolonged pretrial detention of women and girls to 80 penal system officials from nine jurisdictions. The training also included information on international and regional human rights instruments such as the American Convention on Human Rights.

C. Corrections (benchmarks 1, 3 and 5)

50. While important steps have been taken towards enhancing the administrative, managerial and operational capacities of the Directorate of Prison Administration and to improve detention conditions, the draft prison law aimed at the improvement of prisons and the organic law elevating the Directorate of Prison Administration to a central directorate within the national police, with its own financial and administrative autonomy, have not made much progress. The final draft of the prison law is pending validation by the Director-General of the national police, and the organic law is under review by the Minister of Justice and Public Security. Increased political engagement and enhanced use of good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General support efforts to achieve this goal.

51. As at 15 October, the Directorate of Prison Administration was responsible for a total of 11,755 detainees, including 417 women, 278 boys and 15 girls. The occupancy rate stood at 364 per cent, based on the national standard of 2.5 square metres per detainee. The international standard is 4.5 square metres. Extreme overcrowding and poor hygiene conditions in most facilities have contributed to health problems among detainees, such as skin diseases, tuberculosis, diarrhoea and urinary tract infections. The death rate among detainees has increased from 8 per 1,000, as noted in my most recent report, to 11.8 per 1,000 on a projected yearly basis, as at 15 October. The three leading causes of death among detainees are tuberculosis, malnutrition and cardiovascular diseases. The increase in the death rate is mostly due to irregular food deliveries and a shortage of medical staff and medication. Regular payment of suppliers has remained a challenge over the past years. Increased financial and administrative autonomy for the Prison Administration could help to prevent those recurring challenges. The Prison Administration, with support from MINUJUSTH, is implementing the medical road map and the emergency health directives, developing stronger partnerships with the Ministry of Public Health and Population, the World Health Organization and the non-governmental organization Health through Walls

52. The Prison Administration is also implementing a targeted and dedicated recruitment and training strategy, in preparation for the autonomous management of its financial, administrative and human resources. Accordingly, 61 new police graduates, including 9 women, will join the penitentiary service, after undergoing a specialized eight-week training course. This will increase the number of prison officers from 1,182 to 1,242. Furthermore, the Prison Administration is developing a staff performance appraisal tool and has started implementing it in five prisons.

53. The Prison Administration, with the support of MINUJUSTH, elaborated the terms of reference and criteria to certify that prisons operate following national and international norms regarding, inter alia, detention conditions, security, administrative management and reintegration, and are therefore able to operate without full-time support from international actors. A workshop was held on 5 September for 23 senior staff of the Prison Administration and Haitian national police, to sensitize them on the certification criteria and to promote national ownership of the process.

D. Human rights (benchmarks 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9)

54. The new Prime Minister appointed a Minister-delegate for Human Rights and the Fight against Extreme Poverty on 17 September, effectively reinstating the position that had been discontinued in December 2014. The Minister-delegate has taken over the responsibility of human rights focal point in the Government, including by leading the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Human Rights and preparing a national human rights action plan. This appointment is an important development brought about by the combined advocacy of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Mission's leadership. MINUJUSTH is in the process of hiring an expert to assist the Inter-Ministerial Committee in the elaboration of the national human rights action plan.

55. In September, Haiti announced its accession to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The accession to the Conventions follows recommendations of the country's 2016 universal periodic review. Haiti's accession is of particular importance, as it comes at a juncture in which thousands of Haitians are being deported from countries of the region. According to information released by Dominican authorities, 21,707 Haitians were deported or forcibly returned to Haiti from the Dominican Republic during the months of August and September. In 2018, the migratory movements on the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic intensified, and a total of 80,832 Haitians were deported or turned back at the border between January and July. On 27 August, Dominican authorities announced that the national regularization plan for foreigners was terminated, following two extensions.

56. The General Inspectorate of the national police, with support from MINUJUSTH, is in the process of standardizing its criteria as part of the process to improve accountability for human rights violations committed by the national police. Between 1 July and 30 September, the General Inspectorate conducted administrative investigations of 93 per cent of the allegations of human rights violations received. During the reporting period, MINUJUSTH monitored 15 incidents of human rights violations allegedly committed by the national police, which resulted in 51 casualties. Most incidents pertained to allegations of excessive use of force and ill-treatment of detainees following arrest. The Inspectorate has opened administrative investigations into 14 of these incidents. While in most cases no judicial proceedings were initiated, in four incidents the officers allegedly responsible were arrested and face prosecution. This reflects an improvement in relation to the previous reporting period, in which only one incident proceeded to the prosecution stage but will still require the sustained commitment of relevant authorities to ensure that 100 per cent of confirmed crimes or human rights violations committed by national police and Directorate of Prison Administration officers are prosecuted. The Mission will continue to advocate for full and transparent accountability for these incidents.

57. In August, as part of the Mission's efforts to reduce community violence, MINUJUSTH delivered a training in Hinche (Centre region) to reinforce the capacity of local non-governmental organizations to monitor and report on allegations of human rights violations. In a follow-up workshop in October, the participants

demonstrated a deeper knowledge of the subject matter. Similar trainings were delivered in Les Cayes (South region) and Gonaïves (Artibonite region) to staff of the Office of the National Human Rights Ombudsperson. MINUJUSTH also provided technical support to the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Human Rights in organizing a workshop, held in October, on the elaboration of the second report by Haiti to the Human Rights Committee regarding its implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. During the reporting period, local non-governmental organizations have submitted two complaints to the special procedures of the Human Rights Council.

58. In a follow-up to a colloquium organized in September 2017 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in October MINUJUSTH held a workshop on the fight against impunity for past human rights violations for representatives of civil society organizations. The aim was to identify concrete actions that non-governmental organizations can take to advance the fight against impunity, including their role in preparing the national work plan on impunity.

F. Anti-corruption and Permanent Electoral Council (benchmarks 10 and 11)

59. At the end of October, the Provisional Electoral Council submitted a draft organic law to the Government regulating the Permanent Electoral Council. The draft included comments made by the Government on a previous version of the bill. The updated draft law was submitted to Parliament on 14 November. In the absence of a permanent council, the Provisional Electoral Council could organize the legislative elections, which are to renew one third of the Senate and the full Lower Chamber. Both President Moïse in his statement to the General Assembly on 27 September and Prime Minister Céant in his policy statement of 5 September committed to the holding of the elections in October 2019, in accordance with constitutional requirements, while no mention had been made of municipal elections as at the date of publication of the present report. In this regard, the new Government included a Minister-delegate for Electoral Affairs, Patrick Sully Joseph. The specific budget for the 2019 elections was also still under review by the executive.

60. In a letter to my Special Representative dated 25 October, the Government requested the assistance of the United Nations system in Haiti for the organization of the October 2019 elections, noting that the support of the international community in terms of human, material and financial resources would be indispensable. In the same letter, the Government indicated its readiness to welcome a needs assessment mission, aimed at establishing the conditions for technical and operational support and identifying potential partnerships with the international community. Preparations are under way to deploy a team to undertake the needs assessment in early December.

61. Regarding the measures implemented to prevent corruption, the finalized 2017–2018 public expenditure financial report, the drafting of which was supported through the joint rule of law programme, is pending publication. UNDP will continue to provide support for the drafting of the 2018–2019 report under the joint rule of law programme.

IV. Joint transition planning

62. The Prime Minister and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUJUSTH established a joint commission composed of advisers of the Prime Minister and Mission staff, with the active participation of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. The aim of the joint commission is to remove

bottlenecks in the implementation of the MINUJUSTH mandate and exit strategy and to make progress on common priorities. During the reporting period, the joint commission met on three occasions to discuss the sustainability of progress beyond the withdrawal of the Mission with regards to, inter alia, prison overcrowding, prolonged pretrial detention, support to the justice sector and the reduction of community violence. The joint commission has made progress in increasing government understanding of the MINUJUSTH transition process, obtaining agreement for the construction of two tribunals in vulnerable areas of the greater Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, and at the request of the Government, the launch of a dialogue on the electoral process.

63. MINUJUSTH and the United Nations country team continued to prepare for the transition to a non-peacekeeping presence in the country beyond 15 October 2019. A joint resource mobilization strategy, based on the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2017–2021, is being developed by the country team, in collaboration with MINUJUSTH and Headquarters, to support the implementation of its strategic priorities while also taking into account specific requirements, in particular those arising from the new United Nations approach to cholera. The resource requirements will be refined through the finalization of the joint work plan on governance and the rule of law (outcome 5 of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework) for 2019–2020 that will bridge the transition period. While this joint work plan is on track to be finalized by 15 December, the resource and financing gap will require it to be further aligned with the outcome of the strategic assessment requested in resolution 2410 (2018), to be presented in my next report.

64. A transition programming task force supports the development of the joint work plan on governance and the rule of law. The integrated policy and planning group, the coordination body that brings together the senior leadership of the Mission and the United Nations country team and provides strategic direction on peace consolidation efforts and transition, created the task force and placed it under the leadership of my Deputy Special Representative, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator. It seeks to support the Mission and the country team in analysing institutional capacities and additional capacities required by the United Nations following the withdrawal of the Mission and drafting programme and project documents for the country team.

V. Mission support

65. Former MINUSTAH sites that are no longer required for MINUJUSTH have been closed. Mission Support continues to maintain 26 locations: Mission headquarters, police headquarters, seven camps occupied by formed police units and 17 United Nations Police co-locations with the national police. Pre-planning activities to assess the scope of drawdown requirements in preparation for the transition have been initiated. Implementation of the December 2018 repatriation of two formed police units is in progress, which will be followed with activities to close and hand over the respective vacated camps in early 2019.

66. Mission Support continues to implement the supply chain management optimization activities to facilitate the upcoming drawdown. This comprises the reconciliation of large quantities of surplus inventory (expendable and non-expendable) that were transferred from MINUSTAH and effective reduction of the asset holdings to align and meet the mandated requirements of MINUJUSTH. As a priority, the identified surplus will follow the asset disposal strategy of directly supporting projects with the United Nations country team and programmatic activities in the context of the transition and mandate implementation.

67. Efforts to outsource ancillary services such as engineering, environmental and waste management, camp management and maintenance, vehicle maintenance and repairs have been hampered by limited local service provider capacity in Haiti. Operational adjustments have been necessary to sustain the provision of basic mission support services, which have resulted in unforeseen higher costs associated with international outsourcing options. This includes the establishment of on-site services performed by UNOPS contracted personnel. This solution ensures essential and responsive service provision whilst supporting the established lean staffing structure of the mission support concept, as well as facilitating the necessary agility and efficiency required during the draw down and transition of the mission.

VI. Conduct and discipline

68. No new allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have been reported. MINUJUSTH continued the implementation of the three-pronged conduct and discipline strategy for all categories of United Nations personnel. The Mission pursued its prevention activities, including training, risk assessment and public information, to sensitize the Haitian population to United Nations standards of conduct, in particular the zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, complemented by remedial action. As part of the remedial action, the Mission maintained continuous communication and referral for assistance of the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse.

VII. Observations

69. The unfolding of the 17 October and 18 November demonstrations is a sign of the capacity of the national police to professionally control crowds demonstrating throughout the country. The vigorous debate that is currently taking place regarding accountability for the use of the PetroCaribe funds should encourage civil society and the opposition to engage in a constructive dialogue, and the Government to demonstrate with concrete actions its willingness to address the demands of the population. Such dialogue may in turn sustain the basic requirements for the long-term stability of the country.

70. To maintain that momentum, it will be critical that concrete action be taken to address corruption, including the allegations of mismanagement of the PetroCaribe funds. A key indicator of progress will be the ability of the judiciary to complete the investigations and bring charges as needed against those individuals and companies that have allegedly defrauded the Haitian people. In this regard, I welcome the declaration of the Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes that their report will be ready by January 2019, and I encourage the Superior Council of the Judiciary to ensure that magistrates under its jurisdiction enjoy the necessary independence to conduct the required judicial proceedings. Failure to do so in an effective manner would contribute to the destabilization of the country. At this critical juncture, it is essential that actors from across the political spectrum, from all branches of Government and from civil society work together for the common good.

71. The holding of 2019 elections will be a crucial milestone for the stability of Haiti. I welcome the Government's commitment to hold the elections on schedule, and I take note of its request for electoral assistance from the United Nations. I encourage the Haitian authorities to swiftly adopt the electoral law, update the electoral lists and pass the electoral budget to pave the way for credible, timely and inclusive elections. I also encourage all political actors and civil society to engage in a constructive dialogue towards peaceful elections.

72. Delays in the adoption and implementation of State programmes and the slow-moving legislative process continued to contribute to a lack of public confidence in the country's institutions and to deter internal and external private investment critical to fostering sustainable development, ultimately increasing the challenges to be overcome by the people. If not addressed, those conditions will bring further destabilization and divert Haiti from its path towards achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Immediate assistance, in particular to reinforce social safety nets, will be crucial in the coming months. Enhanced collaboration between the executive branch and the parliament, possibly including through the establishment of a coordinated legislative agenda for the legislative year 2019, would also bring momentum to the legislative process.

73. The decades-old phenomenon in Haitian prisons of severe overcrowding and poor conditions owing in part to recurrent arrests pending legal recourse and the effects of the malfunctioning of the judicial system must be tackled with renewed energy, effort, political will and adequate resources. At the same time, renewed efforts will be required to adequately confront the persistent phenomenon of gang violence in Haiti, including by engaging affected communities in violence reduction programming.

74. Despite the integrated efforts of the Government and the United Nations system in Haiti, much remains to be done to achieve the objectives of the MINUJUSTH exit strategy. I am concerned that the achievement of a substantial number of indicators remain elusive, especially regarding the adoption and implementation of legislation deemed critical for the consolidation of the rule of law in Haiti. Sustained efforts by the leaders and people of the country, with the support of MINUJUSTH, the United Nations country team and the wider international community, will be required to ensure a smooth and effective transition to a non-peacekeeping presence in the coming year.

75. Progress must also continue in consolidating the rule of law. Maintaining a stable political environment and keeping reform priorities on track are instrumental to that end. A renewed commitment by both the Government and the international community to the adoption of the strategic plan by the Superior Council of the Judiciary and the allocation of budgetary resources for its implementation are some of the necessary steps. Efforts must be redoubled to ensure that the benchmarks are attained and form a solid foundation on which to strengthen the rule of law, consolidate stability and advance towards sustainable development.

76. MINUJUSTH will continue to work with government officials, the international community and civil society organizations to support dialogue efforts through the good offices of my Special Representative. Broad cooperation between relevant stakeholders, including the private sector and civil society, and enhanced communication between the Haitian institutions and the public are key to ensuring success in addressing priority tasks, including the adoption of short-term measures that can respond to the immediate needs of the people.

77. In conclusion, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my Special Representative for Haiti, Helen Meagher La Lime, and the women and men of MINUJUSTH for their courage and dedication in consolidating the rule of law and promoting human rights in Haiti, as well as to those Member States that have provided police personnel for the Mission.

Annex I

Benchmark indicators, targets and baselines

Symbol	*Equivalent*	*Symbol*	*Equivalent*
	On track to achieve target by the timeline		Challenges expected to achieve target by the timeline but with a descending trend
	Challenges expected to achieve target by the timeline but with a positive trend		No progress/Not on track to achieve target by timeline
	Challenges expected to achieve target by the timeline but with a stagnating trend		No update on progress was expected during the reporting period

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
1. The executive and legislative branches have promulgated legislation that improves access to justice, enhances the development of the national police and addresses prolonged pretrial detention, which is a cause of prison overcrowding; all branches have initiated implementation of the new legislation, including through sustainable budget allocations	1.1 Existence of the new Criminal Code (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — New Criminal Code is promulgated	1 — Review of the draft completed by the justice and security commission of the Senate. Lower chamber has engaged in discussions with different actors to build support for the adoption of the draft.	
	1.2 Existence of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — Code of Criminal Procedure is promulgated	1 — Review of the draft completed by the justice and security commission of the Senate. Lower chamber has engaged in discussions with different actors to build support for the adoption of the draft.	
	1.3 Existence of the Legal Aid Law (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — Legal Aid Law is promulgated	3 — Law on the creation, organization and functioning of the National Council on Legal Aid adopted by both chambers on 10 September 2018, transferred to President on 27 September and published in the official gazette on 26 October	

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
	1.4 Existence of the organic law on the Haitian National Police elevating Directorate of Prison Administration to a central directorate (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — Organic law on national police is promulgated	1 — Draft organic law is pending validation by the Director General of the national police.	
	1.5 Existence of the Prison Law (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by President)	April 2019	3 — Prison Law is promulgated	1 — Draft prison law pending final validation by Directorate of Prison Administration	
	1.6 Identification of the implementation requirements by the relevant institutions, including budgetary allocations, for the new legislation (disaggregated by law)	October 2019	Implementation requirements, including budgetary allocations, are determined for new legislation	Identification of implementation requirements for: (a) Draft Criminal Code: not yet adopted (b) Code of Criminal Procedure: not yet adopted (c) Legal Aid Law: a technical committee on the implementation of the law has been set up by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (d) Organic law on national police: not yet adopted (e) Prison Law: not yet adopted	
	1.7 Number of new case files processed in real time by the prosecutors in the jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince	October 2019	800 new case files processed in real time by the prosecutors in the jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince	October 2017–September 2018: 444 new cases processed in real time by Port-au-Prince jurisdiction prosecutors	

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
	1.8 Proportion of detainees in pretrial detention in excess of two years at the civil prison of Port-au-Prince	October 2019	50.4 per cent of detainees in pretrial detention at the civil prison of Port-au-Prince	15 October: 63.6 per cent (2,346 out of 3,690)	→
	1.9 Number of cases closed by investigative judges in the jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince	October 2019	750 orders issued	October 2017–September 2018: 365 orders issued	→
	1.10 Number of penal cases adjudicated by the court of first instance of Port-au-Prince	October 2019	800 penal cases adjudicated by the court of first instance of Port-au-Prince	October 2017–September 2018: court of first instance of Port-au-Prince adjudicated 411 penal cases	↘
2. The Haitian authorities make timely, gender-balanced and merit-based appointments in the justice sector, including in the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Court of Cassation and the Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes	2.1 Existence of the annual report of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, to include: judiciary staffing by gender; judiciary inspection results; number of certified judges; and implementation of judge evaluation process	April 2019	Annual report of the Superior Council of the Judiciary available, including: judiciary staffing by gender; judiciary inspection results; number of certified judges; and implementation of judge evaluation process	The report on the state of the judiciary is being revised by the Superior Council of the Judiciary. This report will then be used as a basis to start the Superior Council's annual report, which has not yet been initiated.	→
	2.2 Number of seats filled at the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Court of Cassation and the Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes, disaggregated by gender	April 2019	Superior Council of the Judiciary: 9/9 (3 women) Court of Cassation: 12/12 (4 women) Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes: 9/9 (3 women)	(a) Superior Council of the Judiciary: 9/9 (0 women). (b) Court of Cassation: 6/12 (1 woman). On 30 August, the Senate launched for a second time this year a call to fill two of the vacant seats at the Court of Cassation, in order to complete the partial list previously submitted to the executive, which would allow for only four of the six vacant seats to be filled. The issue of the mandate of the President of the	↘

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
				Court of Cassation is not resolved. (c) Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes: 9/9 (2 women)	
3. The Directorate of Prison Administration performs key management functions providing basic services to all detainees and ensures respect for their rights	3.1 Number of deaths per 1,000 inmates	October 2019	Ratio equal to or below 10/1,000 inmates	1 January to 15 October 2018: 11.8/1,000 inmates (100 deaths registered)	
	3.2 Number of prisons supported by functioning health services for inmates, disaggregated by gender	October 2019	Nine out of 18 prisons and four largest national police holding facilities supported by adequate health-care facilities for inmates	Seven out of 18 prisons supported by functioning health services for inmates	
	3.3 Number of Directorate of Prison Administration officers recruited through a dedicated process, disaggregated by gender, out of the 941 new officers required by 2021 to meet the Directorate's needs	October 2019	300 Directorate of Prison Administration officers recruited, of whom 30 per cent are women, out of the total 941 new officers to meet the Directorate's needs by 2021	61 recruits, including 9 women, graduated from the twenty-ninth promotion of the national police to be deployed to the Directorate of Prison Administration.	
	3.4 Number of prisons certified by the Directorate of Prison Administration as being able to operate without full-time support from international actors (MINUJUSTH or others)	October 2019	Nine prisons certified out of 18	Criteria for certification elaborated and draft evaluation survey validated by the Directorate of Prison Administration. Joint monitoring and evaluation committee of the Directorate and MINUJUSTH to oversee certification process also instituted	

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
4. The national police responds to public disorder and manages security threats throughout Haiti, demonstrating elevated levels of professionalism, human rights awareness and gender sensitivity, without requiring international support, as a result of the implementation of the relevant priorities of the strategic development plan of the national police for 2017–2021	4.1 Implementation rate of the strategic development plan of the national police for 2017–2021	October 2019	43 per cent implemented (57 of 133 priorities in strategic development plan)	The first annual evaluation of the strategic development plan for 2017–2021 has been completed. The overall rate of implementation of the plan is 27.6 per cent (no priority actions completed, 9 at an advanced stage, 39 initiated and 14 not started).	
	4.2 Number of police officers per 1,000 citizens	October 2019	1.45	1.37 (increase is due to the graduation of 692 cadets of the twenty-ninth promotion in September 2018)	
	4.3 Percentage of women police officers	October 2019	11 per cent	10 per cent (1,568 women out of 15,735 total)	
	4.4 Percentage of national police capacity statically deployed outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area	October 2019	40 per cent	34.2 per cent	
	4.5 Number of specialized public order units out of the 13 existing units of the national police (12 Unités départementales pour le maintien de l'ordre and 1 Compagnie d'intervention et de maintien de l'ordre) capable of responding to security threats with no MINUJUSTH support	October 2019	All 13 units are capable of responding to security threats with no MINUJUSTH support	A total of 6 of the 13 units operate without MINUJUSTH support	
	4.6 Percentage of public order/security operations planned and executed by national police without MINUJUSTH support	October 2019	100 per cent of operations without MINUJUSTH support	97 per cent of operations without MINUJUSTH support	

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
	4.7 Percentage of national budget allocated to national police	October 2019	8.0 per cent of national budget allocated to national police	6.6 per cent of national budget allocated to the national police. The amended budget for fiscal year 2017–2018 adopted on 30 August lists a slight decrease in the funds allocated to the national police	↘
5. Strengthened internal oversight and accountability mechanisms in the justice, corrections and police sectors address misconduct and ensure increased effectiveness and compliance with human rights	5.1 Number of courts of first instance inspected (out of 18) Number of appeal courts inspected (out of 5)	April 2019	All 18 courts of first instance and 5 appeal courts inspected by the Ministry of Justice	No inspection conducted. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security carried out preparatory activities with the support of MINUJUSTH, in order to perform inspection missions during the judicial year 2018–2019	↗
	5.2 Percentage of allegations of human rights violations against public officials (national police officers, Directorate of Prison Administration officials) investigated by the General Inspectorate of the national police	April 2019	80 per cent of all allegations investigated by the General Inspectorate of the national police	1 January–30 September: 84.3 per cent of allegations investigated against national police officers, including Directorate of Prison Administration agents (204 investigations out of 242 allegations received).	✓
	5.3 Percentage of confirmed misconduct by national police and Directorate of Prison Administration officers disciplined by the national police	April 2019	60 per cent of cases investigated have sanctions implemented	1 January–30 September: 6.8 per cent (13 cases have been sanctioned out of 190 allegations of misconducts against national police officers, including Directorate of Prison Administration officials, investigated by the General Inspectorate of the national police)	↘

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
	5.4 Percentage of confirmed crimes or human rights violations committed by national police and Directorate of Prison Administration officers prosecuted by judicial authorities	April 2019	100 per cent of confirmed crimes or human rights violations committed by national police officers prosecuted by judicial authorities	15 July–17 October: police officers were prosecuted in 7 per cent (4 out of 57) of the cases of alleged human rights violations.	
	5.5 Percentage of staff of the General Inspectorate of the national police deployed outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, disaggregated by gender	April 2019	30 per cent of projected 340 staff of the General Inspectorate of the national police deployed outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area	October 2018: none of the 198 personnel assigned to the General Inspectorate of the national police are deployed outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.	
6. Haitian women and men, in particular those from the most vulnerable and marginalized communities, demonstrate increased trust in the capability and willingness of the justice system to address crime and of the national police to provide security	6.1 Proportion of the population expressing satisfaction on how the national police performs at reducing crime	April 2019	88 per cent	The survey has yet to be undertaken.	
	6.2 Number of youth at risk and women benefiting from community violence reduction/reinsertion programmes demonstrating willingness to work with national police community policing initiatives and law enforcement authorities	April 2019	500 youth at risk and women cooperating with national police community policing and law enforcement authorities	458 at-risk youth and women cooperating with national police community policing and law enforcement authorities.	
	6.3 Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 citizens, disaggregated by gender and age	April 2019	Rate of 9.3 or less of intentional homicide, disaggregated by gender and age	2018 (From January to 18 October): 6.22 equivalent to 591 intentional homicides out of which 535 victims were men, 37 women, 12 male minors and 7 female minors.	
	6.4 Number of kidnappings reported in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area	April 2019	50 or fewer kidnappings reported in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area	1 January–18 October 2018: 37 cases of kidnapping concerning 40 people (18 men and 22 women)	

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
	6.5 Number of gang-related incidents in the hotspot zones of Cité Soleil, Bel-Air and Martissant	April 2019	18 or fewer gang-related incidents in the hotspot zones of Cité Soleil, Bel-Air and Martissant	1 January–18 October 2018: 21 incidents	
	6.6 Number of sexual and gender-based violence cases investigated by national police, reflecting enhanced national police capacity	April 2019	At least 275 cases of sexual and gender-based violence are investigated	1 January–18 October 2018: 182 cases were investigated	
7. The national Office of the Ombudsperson functions independently and protects citizens whose rights have been violated	7.1 Level of compliance of the Office of the Ombudsperson with international standards on the work of national human rights institutions, and structural capacity to operate as an independent and effective institution in accordance with the Paris Principles	October 2019	A status according to Paris Principles	A status according to Paris Principles until next decision of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions due for May 2019	
	7.2 Number of recommendations of the Office of the Ombudsperson implemented by national rule of law institutions	April 2019	Three recommendations of the of the Ombudsperson implemented by national rule of law institutions	None	

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
8. Civil society organizations, including those representing women, engage with the Haitian authorities to advocate the promotion and protection of human rights, and are empowered to bring allegations of human rights violations to the competent judicial or administrative authorities	8.1 Number of alternative reports prepared and submitted by civil society organizations to international human rights mechanisms	April 2019	Two reports prepared and submitted by civil society organizations to international human rights mechanisms	No meetings or reviews by international human rights mechanisms in the reporting period	
	8.2 Number of cases reported by local civil society organizations monitoring human rights violations	April 2019	10 reports published by local civil society organizations monitoring human rights violations	Eight reports published by local civil society organizations monitoring human rights	
9. National authorities comply with international human rights obligations, including holding individuals responsible for current and past human rights violations and fulfilling their reporting obligations to human rights treaty bodies	9.1 Availability of national plan of action for human rights	October 2019	National plan of action for the implementation of the recommendations made by human rights mechanisms, in particular through the universal periodic review of the Human Rights Council	In September, Stéphanie Auguste was appointed Minister-delegate for Human Rights and the Fight against Extreme Poverty. The Minister-delegate leads the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Human Rights, the entity responsible for preparing the national action plan for human rights.	
	9.2 Number of recommendations made by the human rights mechanisms accepted by the Government of Haiti	April 2019	Three recommendations made by human rights mechanisms accepted by the Government of Haiti	No meetings or reviews by international human rights mechanisms in the reporting period. However, in September, the Government implemented two recommendations that had been made by the universal periodic review: accession to the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.	

Benchmark	*Indicator*	*Target timeline*	*Target*	*Update as at 15 October (or otherwise specified)*	*Trend*
	9.3 Number of reports prepared and submitted to international human rights mechanisms by the Government of Haiti	April 2019	Two reports prepared and submitted to international human rights mechanisms by the Government of Haiti	No meetings or reviews by international human rights mechanisms in the reporting period	
	9.4 Appointment by the Government of Haiti of a high-level human rights focal point within the executive branch	April 2019	One high-level focal point within the executive branch appointed by the Government of Haiti	In September, the Prime Minister appointed Stéphanie Auguste as the Minister-delegate for Human Rights and the Fight against Extreme Poverty. The Minister-delegate replaces the Minister of Justice as human rights focal point.	
10. Rule of law and anti-corruption institutions demonstrate increased capacity to fight corruption	10.1 Availability of annual report on public spending by Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes	April 2019	The annual report on public spending of Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes is available	The report is pending publication.	
11. The Permanent Electoral Council is established through a credible and transparent process and exercises its electoral responsibilities in an independent and transparent manner, without requiring international support	11.1 Nomination by the three branches of their three members for the Permanent Electoral Council, with a view to establishing the Council as an operational and independent body	October 2019	The nine members are nominated and the Permanent Electoral Council is established, is operational and functions independently	Nomination process of the three representatives has been initiated by each branch.	
	11.2 Update of the electoral lists in preparation of the next electoral cycle	October 2019	The electoral lists are updated	Not yet undertaken	
	11.3 Existence of the Electoral Law in preparation of the next electoral cycle (1 — draft law initiated; 2 — draft law voted by each chamber; 3 — law promulgated by the President)	October 2019	3 — Electoral Law is promulgated	1 — Draft law was transmitted by the executive to Parliament on 14 November	

Annex II

Composition and strength of the police component of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti as at 12 November 2018

	United Nations police officers		*Formed police unit members*	
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Argentina	1	9	–	–
Benin	–	22	–	–
Bangladesh	–	3	19	120
Burkina Faso	–	13	–	–
Brazil	–	–	–	–
Canada	6	11	–	–
Chad	1	5	–	–
Chile	1	1	–	–
Cameroon	5	1	–	–
Colombia	–	–	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	1	19	–	–
Djibouti	–	1	–	–
El Salvador	–	2	–	–
Ethiopia	–	–	–	–
France	–	–	–	–
Germany	1	–	–	–
Guinea	–	2	–	–
India	–	–	–	280
Indonesia	–	–	–	–
Jordan	–	8	–	140
Madagascar	1	14	–	–
Mali	–	9	–	–
Mexico	–	1	–	–
Nepal	1	3	7	133
Niger	–	22	–	–
Nigeria	1	3	–	–
Norway	3	–	–	–
Pakistan	–	1	–	–
Philippines	–	–	–	–
Portugal	–	–	–	–
Republic of Korea	3	1	–	–
Romania	2	8	–	–
Russian Federation	–	5	–	–
Rwanda	–	6	14	126
Senegal	8	6	16	138
Slovakia	–	2	–	–
Spain	–	2	–	–

Country	*United Nations police officers*		*Formed police unit members*	
	Women	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Sri Lanka	–	1	–	–
Sweden	1	2	–	–
Togo	2	5	–	–
Tunisia	4	22	–	–
Turkey	–	12	–	–
Uruguay	–	1	–	–
United States of America	–	5	–	–
Subtotal	**42**	**228**	**56**	**937**
Total		**270**		**993**
				1 263

Annex III

United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti: deployment map



United Nations S/2018/1060

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 November 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 28 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 27 and 28 November 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) D. **Polyanskiy**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-20582 (E) 301118 041218

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Annex to the letter dated 28 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (27 November 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported seven incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: five in Ladhiqiyah, one in Aleppo and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported six incidents of gunfire: three in Aleppo Governorate and three in Hama Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring has carried out one humanitarian operation: in Aftris, Damascus Governorate, 450 food parcels with a total weight of 1.95 tons were delivered.

In total, 2,003 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 3,139.15 tons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged – it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (28 November 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire: three in Ladhiqiyah Governorate and two in Aleppo Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported seven incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: two in Aleppo, two in Hama, two in Idlib and one in Ladhiqiyah.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 2,003 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 3,139.15 tons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged – it is still 234.

United Nations S/2018/1061

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 November 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 28 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to the letter dated 20 November 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, wherein the missile attack by the Iranian armed forces against terrorist elements in Syria was incorrectly assessed to amount to ballistic missile activity inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) of the Security Council, I would like to bring the following to your attention:

As it has been made clear in the letter dated 3 October 2018 from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2018/891), the Iranian armed forces targeted terrorist elements in Syria only on 1 October 2018. Therefore, the reference to "30 September" in the aforesaid letter is inaccurate.

On different occasions in the past, including in its letters dated 23 March 2016 (S/2016/279), 17 July 2016 (S/2016/626), 29 June 2017 (S/2017/560), 23 August 2017 (S/2017/731) and 28 August 2017 (S/2017/739), the Islamic Republic of Iran has firmly rejected any arbitrary interpretation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), including paragraph 3 of its annex B, according to which Iran is called upon "not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons".

The deliberate addition of the phrase "designed to be" to the wording "capable of delivering nuclear weapons" used in terminated Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) was a deliberate modification following lengthy negotiations in order to exclude Iran's defensive missile programme that is "designed" to be exclusively capable of delivering conventional warheads. Therefore, since none of Iran's missiles are "designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons", paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) in no way limits activities related to the conventional ballistic missiles of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) is quite clear and devoid of any ambiguity when it comes to ballistic missiles. It does not prohibit legitimate and conventional military activities, nor does international law disallow them. Neither of the missiles of the Islamic Republic of Iran are "designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons", nor it has undertaken any activity related to ballistic missiles "designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons". Therefore, Iran's related activities not only are in no way inconsistent with the resolution but also fall outside of its purview.

Iran has never sought to acquire nuclear weapons and never will in the future, as it fully honours its commitment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Moreover, the language in paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) is clearly not mandatory. Therefore, Iran calls upon all parties to act in good faith and refrain from provocations.

In that letter, an attempt was made to reinterpret paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) by invoking the criteria contained in the Missile Technology Control Regime. It is crystal clear that in paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) there is no implicit or explicit reference either to the Missile Technology Control Regime or to definitions and criteria contained therein; therefore, none of those criteria or definitions are applicable to this paragraph. Accordingly, we reject any attempt to reinterpret paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) by means of definitions or criteria contained in the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is only a political understanding between a 35-member exclusive and closed export control club serving the commercial and security interests of its members.

As a country living in the most unstable and volatile region of the world, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully entitled to build a credible conventional capability to deter and defend against any aggression. As part of that capability, the missile programme of Iran is a legitimate defence capability against security threats and an effective means for exercising the right to self-defence in the event of any armed attack, including terrorist actions.

Recalling that the Security Council, in its press statement issued on 24 September 2018 (SC/13523) following the 22 September 2018 terrorist attack in Ahvaz, "underlined the need to hold perpetrators, organizers, financers and sponsors of these reprehensible acts of terrorism accountable", it is extremely disappointing and highly questionable that at a time when there is a dire need to suppress terrorist groups in such a volatile region as the Middle East, certain States choose to describe the antiterrorist missile operation by the Iranian armed forces on 1 October 2018 against terrorist elements in Syria as "destabilizing" and increasing "regional tensions". It is obvious that such a politically motivated expression has nothing to do with the subject of resolution 2231 (2015) and thus is inconsistent with its letter as well as spirit and needs to be avoided.

Indeed, a high priority should be accorded to "promoting the adherence to resolution 2231 (2015) by all States", as stated in that letter. This should be a consistent policy and should be applied to all countries, in particular those with a documented track record of violating its provisions and those taking subversive measures in its implementation, while, according to the resolution, they should refrain from taking any such actions.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Eshagh **Al Habib**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2018/1074

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 November 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 20 November 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

France, Germany and the United Kingdom wish to bring to the attention of the Security Council actions on the part of Iran which are inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

As the Security Council is aware, in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015),

> Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action adoption day or until the date on which the International Atomic Energy Agency submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

The phrase "ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons" in paragraph 3 includes Missile Technology Control Regime category I systems. By definition, these systems are capable of delivering at least a 500-kilogram payload to a range of at least 300 kilometres and are therefore inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

On 30 September and 1 October, Iran launched Zolfaqar and Qiam short-range ballistic missiles on targets in the town of Hajin, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, Syria.

While we take note of Iran's official position on these missile strikes as a response to a terrorist attack in Iran, we assess that Iran's firing of the short-range ballistic missiles described above amounts to ballistic missile activity inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Furthermore, this ballistic missile activity is destabilizing and increases regional tensions.

The Zolfaqar and Qiam short-range ballistic missiles both meet the Missile Technology Control Regime category I criteria and, as such, are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Iran's missile strikes clearly constitute "activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons" and "launches using such ballistic missile technology", which Iran is called upon not to undertake under paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

Furthermore, we strongly condemn the messages written on the missiles, as reported in Iranian and international media, which threatened the United States of America, Israel and the Saudi royal family. This aggressive rhetoric is unacceptable.

18-20489 (E) 301118

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We trust that this information will assist the Security Council in promoting adherence to resolution 2231 (2015) by all States. We respectfully request the Secretary-General to submit a thorough report on Iran's ballistic missile activity inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

We also propose that these launches be discussed in the Security Council's 2231 format, the structure established to facilitate monitoring the resolution's implementation, so that the Council can discuss appropriate responses.

(*Signed*) François **Delattre**
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Christoph **Heusgen**
Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Karen **Pierce**
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of the United Nations

United Nations S/2018/1063

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 November 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 28 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, in its capacity as President of the Security Council during the month of December 2018, will hold a debate on the topic "Post-conflict reconstruction and peace, security and stability", in connection with the item entitled "Peacebuilding and sustaining peace".

I have the honour to inform you that the meeting will take place on 5 December 2018, at 10 a.m., in the Security Council Chamber. To guide a fruitful discussion, we have prepared a concept note (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Léon H. Kacou **Adom**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-20584 (E) 301118 031218

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Annex to the letter dated 28 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]

Ivoirian Presidency of the Security Council in December 2018

High-level Presidential debate on the topic "Post-conflict reconstruction and peace, security and stability"

Concept note

I. Context and challenges

In many countries where the United Nations has intervened or has a presence in the form of peacebuilding mechanisms or peacekeeping operations, which in recent years have been given multidimensional mandates, its actions to consolidate and definitively restore peace on the ground after a conflict have had only limited results.

This situation largely results from the profound effects of conflict on the country: destruction of the fabric of its economy, major loss of human life, grave and massive human rights violations, significant material damage and weakening of its institutions and national cohesion.

Emerging from crises through a strategy of vigorous and inclusive economic and social recovery and reform, coupled with peacebuilding, restoring security through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reform of the security sector and consolidating and sustaining peace and security through a long-term vision of sustainable development are among the lessons that Côte d'Ivoire can draw from its own experience in the hope of making that experience useful to countries in crisis in their efforts for peace.

Thanks to the support provided by the international community as a whole to the strategies and efforts of Côte d'Ivoire, the country was able to emerge from a decade of crisis by combining three essential processes: economic (growth, tax revenue, social measures), security (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform), and political (reconciliation, justice and human rights and elections).

II. The foundations of the Ivoirian model for emerging from crisis and sustaining peace post-conflict

In 2011, Côte d'Ivoire emerged exhausted from over 10 years of crisis and surprised the international community by the speed and strength of its recovery and its post-conflict process of consolidating and sustaining peace.

This resulted from the relevance and scope of the first steps taken by the democratically-elected President of the Republic, even before the end of the post-election crisis, in order to avoid the collapse of the State and the national economy.

The effectiveness of these initial measures allowed the Government to take immediate ownership of peacebuilding activities and to place ending the crisis in an overall context of restoration of the State and the country's development and security.

The process of economic and social recovery and post-conflict reconstruction conducted by Côte d'Ivoire, in trust and cooperation with the United Nations and bilateral and multilateral partners, was amply supported by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, in the security and political areas in particular.

The foundation thus was laid to carry out essential economic and sectoral reforms at the same time as social measures to rebuild confidence, attract investment and combat the root causes that had led to the crisis were being implemented.

Growth and social redistribution thus interacted positively with security and democratic reforms, which they supported. The example of Côte d'Ivoire shows that by combining the efforts of the United Nations, the host country and bilateral and multilateral partners, a process of emerging from crisis supported by economic recovery can produce rapid results.

In order to promote sustained peace, a long-term vision is also needed, along the lines of the goals of the African Union Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

III. Questions for consideration

1. Can economic recovery measures post-conflict followed by structural reforms have an impact on a return to stability, both short-term and sustained? What types of measures and reforms are most effective? How can they be funded and implemented?

2. How can internal cohesion be strengthened in countries emerging from crisis where the fabric of society has been shredded by decades of conflict?

3. Does the implementation of the Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development contribute to the achievement of the objectives of peace and security?

4. What lessons can the Security Council draw from the process of peacebuilding and sustaining peace implemented in Côte d'Ivoire?

United Nations S/2018/1064

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 November 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 28 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, in its capacity as President of the Security Council during the month of December 2018, will hold an open debate on the topic "Role of States, regional bodies and the United Nations in the prevention and resolution of conflicts", in connection with the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security".

I have the honour to inform you that the meeting will take place on 6 December 2018, at 10 a.m., in the Security Council Chamber. To guide a fruitful discussion, we have prepared a concept note (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Léon H. Kacou **Adom**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-20585 (E) 031218 031218

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Annex to the letter dated 28 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]

Côte d'Ivoire Presidency of the Security Council in December 2018

High-level ministerial debate on the topic "The role of States, regional arrangements and the United Nations in the prevention and resolution of conflicts"

I. Context and challenges

During the high-level presidential debate, Heads of State will address the question of crisis recovery and peace and security processes from the perspective of post-conflict economic reconstruction.

The high-level ministerial debate will focus on the earlier phases of preventing and resolving conflicts, which destabilize States and feed on and sustain fragile situations. The aim is to consider the effectiveness of seeking closer cooperation between the United Nations, States and regional and subregional organizations.

Many contemporary conflicts are internal crises, which are perpetuated or repeated in the absence of political processes to end them. Moreover, in a growing number of cases they are taking place in environments where the situation is severely exacerbated by new threats, such as asymmetric threats from non-State actors, terrorist acts, criminal trafficking, massive human rights violations or the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian relief.

Despite the efforts of recent years, responses to these situations are not sufficiently effective. The international community must be more innovative in reforming the peace architecture, as proposed by the Secretary-General. His Action for Peacekeeping initiative should lead the international community to overcome its divisions for the sake of effectiveness.

With regard to cooperation between the United Nations, States and regional and subregional organizations, the experience of Côte d'Ivoire with the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire is unanimously considered to be a successful example of State involvement in and national ownership of a crisis recovery process with the support of the international community.

The involvement of States and regional and subregional organizations and their close cooperation with the United Nations must be strengthened and built into a new peace architecture that is effective, respects human rights and takes into account the issue of financing.

A. A new peace architecture for better cooperation between the United Nations, States and regional and subregional organizations

In his statement contained in S/PRST/2016/12, the President of the Security Council underlined both the importance of national ownership and leadership in peacebuilding and the critical contribution of cooperation with regional and subregional organizations to peacebuilding.

It is also important to:

- Establish, in accordance with Chapters V and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, a new peace architecture founded on subsidiarity based on the suitability of each level of actor to design, implement or coordinate peace initiatives.
- Ensure coordination and coherence between levels of responsibility by strengthening coordination between levels of action and internal coherence within the United Nations system.

B. Effectiveness of peace operations and respect for human rights

To ensure effectiveness through compliance with management and transparency rules, it is necessary to set clear and objective standards of performance and accountability and strengthen the role of women in peacekeeping.

There is a need to ensure that peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations respect human rights and international humanitarian law. Such operations must be conducted in accordance with obligations under international humanitarian law, human rights law and international refugee law.

It is also necessary to respond more quickly to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, provide greater support to victims and be more effective in seeking justice.

Finally, mechanisms must be sought to better address grave or massive human rights violations and non-compliance with humanitarian law in areas of operations.

C. Financing

In the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, signed on 19 April 2017, both organizations expressed their desire to find ways to ensure predictable and sustainable financing for peace operations in Africa. The Action for Peacekeeping initiative has reaffirmed that need.

Progress must be made on this issue.

II. Questions for consideration

1. How can cooperation between the United Nations, States and regional and subregional organizations in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts be strengthened in practice? Which regional actors are likely to participate in new partnership agreements with the United Nations?
2. What concrete steps can be taken to improve the suitability of mandates, in particular those relating to the most exposed environments? Should a new framework be defined for offensive operations and, if so, what objectives, partners and resources should it include?
3. What progress should be sought with regard to the performance of peace operations, transparency and respect for human rights and humanitarian law?
4. How can financial engineering be used to generate the necessary sustainable public and private financing?

United Nations S/2018/1065

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 November 2018

Original: English

The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 10 August 2018 (S/PRST/2018/17), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it informed about the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA). It provides an assessment of the major political and security trends in Central Africa since the report of the Secretary-General dated 1 June 2018 (S/2018/521), and an update on progress in the implementation of the mandate of UNOCA. The report also provides an update on the situation in the Lake Chad basin region, pursuant to Council resolution 2349 (2017).

II. Major developments in the Central Africa subregion

A. Political, peace and security developments and trends

2. The political situation in Central Africa was dominated by elections held in a number of countries in the subregion, including Cameroon, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe, and the ongoing preparations for upcoming elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo later in 2018. The security situation remained fragile in some parts of the subregion and social tensions continued to rise in some countries.

3. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held a joint summit of Heads of State and Government on peace, security, stability and the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in Lomé on 30 July. The Heads of State and Government adopted a joint communiqué and the Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, in which they committed to strengthening cooperation on peace and security issues.

Political development and trends

4. On 2 July in Cameroon, at the request of its President, Paul Biya, the National Assembly extended the mandate of all Members of Parliament for one year, beginning 29 October 2018, thereby postponing scheduled legislative elections. Local elections

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were also postponed to 2019 by a presidential decree, citing challenges in organizing the presidential, legislative and local elections simultaneously. The presidential election took place on 7 October. The electoral management body noted that the turnout was particularly low in the North-West and South-West regions. According to the final results announced by the Constitutional Council on 22 October, the President was re-elected with 71.28 per cent of the vote. The voter turnout rate was 53.8 per cent.

5. The security situation in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon continued to deteriorate. Sporadic fighting between security forces and armed groups was reported throughout the reporting period. On 12 July, the convoy of the Minister for Defence was attacked on two separate occasions near Kumba in the South-West region. On the night of 28 to 29 July, an armed group attacked a prison in Ndop in the North-West region, resulting in the escape of 163 inmates. On 26 September, armed individuals also attacked a prison in Wum in the North-West region, leading to the escape of 80 inmates. On 5 November, nearly 80 students and staff from a secondary school in Bamenda, in the North-West region, were kidnapped. All of the students were released the following day. During the reporting period, there were reports of sexual violence perpetrated by both security forces and armed groups. In response, "gender desks" were established at police stations in the South-West region in an effort to establish a safe and confidential reporting process on sexual and gender-based violence and related crimes. On 11 October, religious leaders of the Catholic, Protestant and Muslim communities in the English-speaking regions held a meeting in preparation for an "Anglophone General Conference" scheduled to be held in Buea, in the South-West region, on 21 and 22 November, but which was later postponed. At the same meeting, they reiterated their appeal for the cessation of military and insurgent operations in the English-speaking regions.

6. At a press conference on 11 August, the President of Chad, Idriss Deby Itno, reported that his country needed 70 billion CFA francs (approximately $122 million) in order to organize the legislative elections scheduled for November. He also indicated that consultations were ongoing with the Government's technical and financial partners to seek the necessary assistance. The legislative elections were postponed, reportedly due to financial constraints.

7. On 15 June and 19 October, transhumance-related clashes were reported in the Ouaddaï region of Chad, leading to seven and five deaths, respectively. On 11 August, some 100 armed vehicles attacked two Chadian military garrisons at Kouri Bougoudi — a gold-mining area where many immigrants and Chadians are engaged in mining activities — in the Tibesti desert, near the border with Libya, resulting in the death of at least three Chadian soldiers and the theft of approximately 20 military vehicles. The Chadian armed group, Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République, claimed responsibility for the attack. In response, the Government requested all mine workers to leave the area prior to the initiation of air and ground operations by the armed forces. The Chadian Air Force bombarded two mining operations in the area of Kouri Bougoudi on 13 September, killing two miners and seriously injuring two others. More than 8,000 people of multiple nationalities left the area and requested assistance. On 24 October, another attack against the Chadian defence and security forces was reported in Miski department, near the border with Libya. The spokesperson of the Chadian armed forces announced that the attackers had been neutralized and the situation was under control.

8. The Congo made progress in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed on 23 December 2017. In June, 81 supporters of former rebel leader Frédéric Bintsamou, also known as Pastor Ntumi, were released after having been detained since 2016. The judicial authorities lifted the arrest warrant against Pastor Ntumi and two of his allies on 28 July. On 21 August, Pastor Ntumi joined the weapons collection

operation in the Pool region, which had begun on 7 August. On 31 August, the Government adopted a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. With a total budget of $16.6 million, the programme aims to support 7,500 former rebel combatants as well as displaced populations of the Pool region. On 8 October, the Government reported that 5,665 ex-combatants had been identified and 8,007 weapons had been collected and destroyed.

9. In Equatorial Guinea, the sixth national political dialogue took place from 16 to 23 July with the participation of representatives of the Government and 17 recognized political parties and representatives of civil society and religious groups, as well as the diaspora. International, regional and subregional organizations and diplomatic missions were invited to the dialogue as observers. The opposition group Ciudadanos por la Innovación de Guinea Ecuatorial party was barred from participating in the dialogue, although the President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, had announced a total amnesty on 4 July. Several political leaders in exile also boycotted the dialogue, and few women from the country were in attendance. The final communiqué outlined agreements between the Government, representatives of political parties and the diaspora. However, two opposition parties, Convergencia para la Democracia Social and Unión de Centro Derecha, did not sign the communiqué in protest against the non-application of the announced total amnesty to political actors and the rejection of calls for a transitional government, among other things.

10. In Gabon, the first round of legislative elections and the single round of local elections were held on 6 October. The second round of legislative elections took place on 27 October. The ruling Parti démocratique gabonais won 98 of 143 seats, thereby securing a majority in the National Assembly. The opposition party, Les démocrates, became the second political force with 11 seats. Nineteen women were elected, compared with 15 in the previous legislature.

11. Gabon continued to experience increasing socioeconomic tensions. On 21 and 28 June, the Council of Ministers adopted several austerity measures, including a reduction of salaries in the public sector by 5 to 15 per cent. That was criticized by trade unions and the opposition. On 2 August, the major trade union confederation, Dynamique unitaire, filed an appeal with the Constitutional Court to invalidate the austerity measures and decided to organize demonstrations in Libreville on 13 and 28 August. Despite both demonstrations being banned by the Government, members of the confederation attempted to demonstrate on 28 August, resulting in the arrest of 29 people.

12. In Rwanda, legislative elections took place on 2 and 3 September. The Rwandese Patriotic Front-Inkotanyi coalition party secured 40 of the 80 seats in Parliament, followed by the Social Democratic Party with 5 seats and the Liberal Party with 4 seats. For the first time, representatives of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda and the Social Party Imberakuri, secured two seats each. The parliamentarians were sworn in on 19 September. Overall, women obtained 61 per cent of the seats. Youth, who were accorded a minimum of two seats by a quota system, gained a total of seven seats. Persons living with disabilities were also given one seat by quota. Of the 80 members of the National Assembly, 53 are directly elected and 27 are indirectly elected by representatives of special interest groups.

13. In Sao Tome and Principe, legislative, local and regional elections took place on 7 October. On 19 October, the Constitutional Court announced the final results of the legislative elections. The ruling party, Acção Democrática Independente, won 25 of 55 seats, while the main opposition party, the Movimento de Libertação de São Tome e Príncipe — Partido Social Democrata, gained 23 seats. The opposition coalition, comprising the Partido da Convergência Democrática, the Movimento

Democrático Força da Mudança and the União para a Democracia e Desenvolvimento, secured five seats, and the Movimento de Cidadãos Independentes de São Tomé e Príncipe won two seats. The overall turnout rate was 80.8 per cent. The Minister for Defence and Internal Affairs issued a communiqué on 21 June informing the public that a plot to assassinate the Prime Minister, Patrice Trovoada, had been uncovered and foiled. Subsequently, two suspects, including a member of the Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe — Partido Social Democrata, were arrested but released shortly thereafter due to lack of evidence. On 4 August, the judicial police arrested five people suspected of an alleged attempt to subvert the Constitution.

14. In the Central African Republic, the peace process under the auspices of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation was ongoing, including the preparations for the direct dialogue between the authorities and the main recognized armed groups.

15. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, progress was made in the implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement as well as in the preparations for the general elections scheduled for 23 December 2018. On 19 September, the Independent National Electoral Commission announced the final list of candidates for the presidential, legislative and provincial elections, in accordance with the electoral calendar. The security situation remained fragile in eastern parts of the country, notably in the Beni, Lubero and Masisi territories of North Kivu, in Ituri province, and on the high plateaux of Uvira and the Shabunda territory in South Kivu, where armed groups continued to carry out destabilizing activities. The situation also deteriorated in parts of Haut-Uélé province as a result of the cross-border movements of South Sudanese armed elements; however, in Ituri province, intercommunal violence between the Hema and the Walendu continued to recede.

16. In Burundi, in accordance with the new Constitution revised in May, the National Assembly and the Senate approved new members of the Independent National Electoral Commission on 29 August. The opposition boycotted the parliamentary session, denouncing the new configuration of the Commission as overwhelmingly pro-ruling party and deploring the lack of consensus in the selection and confirmation of its members.

Security developments and trends

Boko Haram-Lake Chad basin

17. From June to 15 October, Boko Haram was responsible for 70 security incidents leading to 104 civilian fatalities in Cameroon, and 13 security incidents resulting in 27 civilian fatalities in Chad. In June, there was a resurgence of suicide attacks perpetrated by the group in the Far North region of Cameroon. On 16 June, a double suicide attack carried out by young girls resulted in the death of a child in Limani, Cameroon. On 20 June and 4 October, double suicide attacks took place in Kolofata in the Mayo-Sava department near the Cameroon-Nigeria border that killed six and seven civilians, respectively. They were the first suicide attacks in the Far North region since March. Other major incidents included the abduction of four children from Baljoel, near the Cameroon-Nigeria border, as well as the incursion into Talkomari, in the Mayo-Moskota arrondissement of the Mayo-Tsanaga department, where Boko Haram beheaded five people and seriously injured several villagers. In response to the increased attacks, the Cameroonian authorities imposed systematic checks on administrative and security vehicles across the country. There were reports on the arrests, detention and expulsion of several Nigerian asylum seekers in Cameroon.

18. In Chad, suspected Boko Haram elements committed multiple violent attacks against villages and islands in May and July, made easier by the low water level in Lake Chad during the dry season. On 19 July, 18 individuals, including women and children, were killed and 10 women were abducted in Mairon village. On 29 September, 4 civilians and 2 soldiers were reportedly killed in an attack attributed to Boko Haram in Moussarom and Ngueleya in the Lac region, while the Chadian army reportedly killed 17 assailants in a counter-offensive. On 4 October, suspected Boko Haram militants launched mortars into a Chadian army base in Litri, 4 kilometres from the border with Nigeria in the Lac region, killing one soldier and injuring another. On 10 October, it was reported that 8 Chadian soldiers were killed and 11 wounded in another attack on the army in Kaiga Kindji. The Chadian army reportedly killed 48 Boko Haram elements.

19. At a ministerial conference of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, held in Abuja on 30 August, member States validated the regional strategy for the stabilization, recovery and resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad basin.

Lord's Resistance Army

20. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continued to pose a regional security threat, notably through the abduction of youths for recruitment. From mid-June to September, in the Central African Republic, 17 attacks and 50 abductions targeting villages and mining sites were recorded in the Haute-Kotto and Haut-Mbomou prefectures, an increase over the last reporting period. From June to September, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 20 attacks and 23 abductions were recorded near Garamba National Park and in the areas of Banda and Mugalie in the Uélé regions. The attacks resulted in the death of two police officers and one park ranger, and another police officer was injured.

Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea

21. From June to September, a total of three attacks were recorded in the Gulf of Guinea, without any casualties. A tanker with 17 Georgian and 2 Russian sailors was reported missing on 14 August in the Gulf of Guinea. The tanker was found off the coast of the Congo 10 days later.

Poaching and illicit trafficking in wildlife and natural resources

22. There were continued reports of poaching activities in Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where LRA and other criminal groups from South Sudan operate. However, the number of poached elephants declined because of reinforced anti-poaching measures. Two cases of elephant poaching were reported in Garamba in the first half of 2018, compared with 45 during the first six months of 2017. In June, Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo announced its closure to tourists until 2019, after 12 rangers were killed and 2 tourists were abducted in less than a year.

23. In August, Cameroonian authorities arrested six suspected traffickers carrying 700 kilograms of live pangolins and pangolin scales at the airport in Douala. The suspected traffickers indicated that the animals were destined for Asian countries.

24. In August, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) deployed a programme coordinator to Libreville to open a subregional office for Central Africa and coordinate the implementation of a four-year project aimed at strengthening national and regional capacities to combat wildlife crime and illicit trafficking in natural resources.

Effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters on the stability of Central Africa

25. Several countries in the region faced humanitarian crises and intensified conflicts, including transhumance-related clashes, the causes of which could also be linked to climate change. In fact, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were listed as the most vulnerable countries in the world in the Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2017.

26. In Chad, the impact of climate change over the past two decades, including land degradation and diminishing water resources, has resulted in chronic food insecurity and malnutrition. The lean season, which usually occurs from June to August, began prematurely in some regions of Chad, depleting food stocks and causing early transhumance. In northern Cameroon, droughts and recurrent floods caused serious land degradation and loss of livelihood, leaving some 2.6 million people in need of food assistance.

B. Humanitarian developments

27. Persistent violent conflicts in some parts of the subregion triggered population displacements, aggravated food insecurity, epidemics and sexual and gender-based violence and hindered access to basic services.

28. In Cameroon, more than 400,000 persons have been internally displaced and over 26,000 have crossed the border into Nigeria as a result of the crisis in the North-West and South-West regions. On 20 June, the Prime Minister of Cameroon, Philémon Yang, announced a Government-led emergency humanitarian assistance plan of 12.7 billion CFA francs (approximately $22.3 million) for the affected regions.

29. In the Central African Republic, continued violence increased the number of refugees to more than 572,000 as at 1 October, while approximately 616,000 remained internally displaced. So far in 2018, 7 humanitarian workers have been killed and 18 have been injured by hostile action, while 294 security incidents against humanitarian actors or organizations have been reported.

30. The humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained worrisome, with 13.1 million people in need of protection and humanitarian assistance, 7.7 million facing food insecurity and 4.5 million internally displaced, 2.4 million of whom were displaced in 2018 alone. Some areas witnessed a significant increase in return movements, notably in the greater Kasai region and Tanganyika. The country hosted more than 536,000 refugees from neighbouring countries while more than 800,000 Congolese sought refuge in the Great Lakes region. Since October 2018, more than 350,000 Congolese nationals were expelled from Angola and arrived in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, mainly in Kasai province. Local populations, as well as those that have been displaced from the Kasai region since August 2016, require urgent assistance including food, household items and shelter, nutrition, health, protection and water and sanitation. The food security situation deteriorated significantly in 2018, affecting 2 million children under the age of 5 who were suffering from severe acute malnutrition. Although in decline since 2017, the cholera epidemic continued to spread. Measles and epidemic malaria currently affect numerous provinces. On 1 August, the Government declared a new outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in North Kivu province, only one week after the first epidemic was declared contained in the western Equateur province. As at 26 November, more than 35,000 people had been vaccinated against the virus; as of the time of writing, 236 casualties (out of 412 cases) have been reported. The increase in the frequency

of attacks by armed groups in the vicinity of Beni continued to hamper response activities.

Boko Haram/Lake Chad basin

31. As of August, some 2.4 million people remained displaced by the nine-year Boko Haram crisis in the Lake Chad basin, including some 97,000 Nigerians who fled to Cameroon and another 10,000 Nigerians who fled to Chad. The crisis has led to significant internal displacement in both Cameroon and Chad, resulting in a major need for assistance with regard to food, nutrition, health and protection, as well as livelihood support. On 4 September, during the High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region, co-hosted by Germany, Nigeria, Norway and the United Nations, donors pledged $2.17 billion to support humanitarian, peacebuilding and development activities in the region by addressing immediate and long-term needs and building the resilience of the affected population. In addition, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and the World Bank announced $467 million in concessional loans.

C. Human rights trends

32. In Cameroon, there were continued reports of killings, kidnappings and plundering attributed to Boko Haram in the Far North region. In the English-speaking regions, fighting between security forces and armed elements continued to cause casualties, and has paralysed a significant portion of economic activity. Civilians, including children, in those regions were victims of extrajudicial killings, killings, abductions, restrictions of movement and access to health and education, as armed confrontations continued. A significant number of internally displaced persons were reportedly seeking refuge in the forests, and had no access to basic services. Human rights organizations and humanitarian actors continued to face restrictions to access in the regions and thus were unable to effectively monitor the situation. Meanwhile, following video footage circulated through social media of the extrajudicial execution of two women and two children by members of the security forces, the authorities arrested the alleged perpetrators and referred them to a military tribunal. The trial of 47 Cameroonians extradited from Nigeria and detained in late January has yet to begin. Civil society and international organizations have denounced the detention of political prisoners and the ill-treatment and torture of detainees. During the period in the run-up to and following the presidential election, cases of restrictions of the freedom of assembly were reported.

33. In the Congo, on the night of 22 to 23 July, 13 youths between the ages of 16 and 28 were found dead while in custody at the Chacona police station in Brazzaville. The information was first reported by a non-governmental organization, the Observatoire congolais des droits de l'homme, and later confirmed by the Minister for Interior. An administrative inquiry into the incident concluded that the young men were assaulted before succumbing to death. Local non-governmental organizations continued to call for an independent, impartial and international investigation. The organizations also denounced the impunity of high-ranking officials involved in the incident.

34. In Equatorial Guinea, allegations of political persecutions, arbitrary arrests and the mistreatment of prisoners continued, notwithstanding the outcome of the sixth national dialogue and the announced amnesty measures. In July, a member of the opposition party Ciudadanos por la Innovación de Guinea Ecuatorial died in the Evinayong prison centre. A magistrate was also found dead in the central police commissariat in Malabo, and several judges in the country were arbitrarily arrested. In August, the President appointed Fermin Nguema Esono, a former political

opponent, as the new President of the Constitutional Court. On 11 October, the President of Equatorial Guinea pardoned 81 prisoners, resulting in the release of 34 members of the Ciudadanos por la Innovación party on 22 October.

35. In Burundi, the Human Rights Council-mandated Commission of Inquiry on Burundi issued a report on 12 September warning that crimes against humanity and other serious violations, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and detentions continued unabated through 2017 and 2018. Hundreds of people took part in Government-sponsored demonstrations against the report on 15 September. In recent months, several unidentified bodies have been recovered from lands, rivers and lakes, some of them displaying signs of violence. According to reports from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the police did not carry out investigations into most cases, claiming that the perpetrators were unidentifiable. Owing to the lack of an official inquiry and the absence of credible and independent human rights monitoring bodies, it remains difficult to confirm events leading to the deaths. The Government of Burundi continued to impose restrictions on freedom of association and expression, especially for members of the opposition or individuals perceived as opponents to the Government. On 13 August, Nestor Nibitanga, a human rights defender and former head of a non-governmental organization, was sentenced to five years in prison in Gitega city for undermining State security and inciting rebellion.

36. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, persisting restrictions on civil and political rights and democratic space remained a concern. Activities of armed groups and militias continued to affect the lives of civilians. Such activities, along with continued inter-ethnic violence, led to large-scale displacements, which notably affected women and children. Conflict-related sexual violence continued to be perpetrated by armed groups and militias, the Congolese armed forces and, to a lesser extent, the national police.

37. In Gabon, little progress was made with regard to the situation of detainees, such as political opposition figures who continued to spend months in prison following various incidents including post-electoral violence. The dates of their trials have yet to be announced.

38. In Chad, concerns persisted with regard to freedom of expression, association and opinion. The Government was accused of systematically repressing protesters in N'Djamena, using live ammunition to disperse them. The Government continued to restrict access to social media. Gender inequality and violence against women and girls remained a concern. The persistent strikes by public service providers continued to constrain the population's access to basic public services, including in the health, education and justice sectors. The new Constitution adopted on 4 May mandated the establishment of a national human rights commission; however, the national process to establish the commission was not in conformity with the Paris Principles.

39. In Rwanda, following a presidential pardon, 2,140 prisoners were released on parole on 15 September. In addition, on 5 October, the High Court of Rwanda granted bail to Diane Rwigara, a former presidential candidate in the 2017 election, who was arrested on charges of forgery and incitement of insurrection, and her mother. The bail was granted under the condition that they would surrender their travel documents and not leave Kigali, pending the result of the trial scheduled for 6 December.

D. Socioeconomic trends

40. Continued tensions and strike actions, partly in response to austerity measures adopted by some member States of ECCAS, dominated the general socioeconomic

environment in the subregion. The situation was also exacerbated by the persisting insecurity and violent conflicts in several countries.

41. In N'Djamena, on 25 July, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of Central African States held its second ordinary meeting to discuss the economic and monetary situation in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Both economic activities and the external position of CEMAC countries were forecasted to improve, especially with real growth rate in gross domestic product estimated at 2.5 per cent, compared with zero growth in 2017. The projections were based on an upward revision of oil production, mainly in the Congo and Chad, reduced public spending and the ongoing implementation of the CEMAC programme of economic and financial reforms. However, challenges remained in most countries in the subregion with regard to the slow resumption of non-oil activities and the countries' increased reliance on external resources linked to programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

42. On 22 August, the President of Gabon, Ali Bongo Ondimba, in his capacity as Chair of ECCAS, met with the President of Equatorial Guinea in Malabo. Both leaders agreed on the need to convene an extraordinary summit of CEMAC Heads of State and Government to discuss the ongoing economic crisis in the subregion. On 25 October, the extraordinary summit took place in N'Djamena. In a final communiqué, the Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the urgency of implementing the economic programmes of IMF. They also urged member States to accelerate subregional integration and common sectoral policy reforms, and to improve governance.

III. Activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

A. Good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation

Cameroon

43. From 17 to 22 November, my Special Representative for Central Africa travelled to Yaoundé. He held consultations with the Prime Minister, the Minister for External Relations, the Minister for Decentralization and Local Development, the President of the electoral management body, religious leaders and members of the diplomatic corps. The discussions focused on past and upcoming elections and efforts to assist the Government in addressing the crisis in the English-speaking regions. From 4 to 9 August, my Special Representative for Central Africa travelled to Yaoundé and held consultations with national authorities, including the Prime Minister. The discussions focused on the situation in the country, especially the crisis in the English-speaking regions, the related humanitarian situation and preparations for the presidential election. From 29 September to 13 October, UNOCA conducted a working-level mission during the electoral period in support of the United Nations Resident Coordinator.

44. In line with the recommendations of the electoral needs assessment mission conducted in July 2017, a technical adviser deployed to the United Nations country team on 24 April continued to help coordinate United Nations support to the electoral management body and other entities involved in the electoral process.

Central African Republic

45. My Special Representative for Central Africa actively engaged the regional actors in support of the political process led by the panel of facilitators of the African

Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation. On 27 September, on the margins of the high-level segment of the seventy-third session of the General Assembly in New York, my Special Representative for Central Africa and my Special Representative for the Central African Republic participated in a high-level ministerial meeting on the Central African Republic, which I co-chaired with the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin Archange Touadera, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of ECCAS. The meeting aimed at taking stock of progress with regard to the political process and strengthening international coordinated engagement for the stabilization of the country, as well as support for the African Initiative.

Chad

46. On 5 and 6 July, my Special Representative accompanied the Deputy Secretary-General to Chad on a high-level mission, jointly conducted by the United Nations, the African Union and Sweden, to assess and reaffirm the role of women in peace, security, development and the prevention of violent extremism. The mission met with the President of Chad and Cabinet Ministers, as well as representatives of the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. It also conducted a field visit to Bol in the Lac region.

Equatorial Guinea

47. Prior to the sixth national dialogue, my Special Representative visited Equatorial Guinea from 23 to 27 June to consult with national authorities, including the President, as well as representatives of the political parties and international stakeholders. On 16 July, he attended the opening ceremony of the national dialogue convened by the President. In his statement, my Special Representative welcomed the President's initiative to hold an inclusive dialogue. A working-level team from UNOCA accompanied the Resident Coordinator in Equatorial Guinea to the dialogue, which was held from 16 to 20 July.

48. On 12 October, on my behalf, my Special Representative attended the official ceremony of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the country's independence. During his visit, he held consultations with key national stakeholders, including the President, to discuss outstanding issues following the national dialogue.

Gabon

49. In the context of social tensions resulting from austerity measures taken by the Government, my Special Representative met with the leaders of the main labour unions on 15 August at their request and was informed of their key demands. Following the meeting, my Special Representative addressed a letter to the Prime Minister listing the concerns raised by the labour unions and encouraging the Government to address the issues through dialogue.

50. On 6 September, an international partner coordination group, which included UNOCA, ECCAS, the International Organization of la Francophonie, the delegation of the European Union and the Embassy of the United States of America, met with the electoral management body to discuss the status of preparations and international support for the legislative and local elections. The group issued a joint statement on the eve of the electoral campaign on 24 September, calling for credible, inclusive and peaceful elections. On 22 October, the group met to review the conduct of the first round of legislative elections and the single round of local elections. The group decided to reconvene after the announcement of the final results.

51. From 9 to 12 October, UNOCA, in cooperation with ECCAS and the national police of Gabon, organized a workshop on police and peacebuilding challenges and trained 33 police officers, including 11 women.

Congo

52. My Special Representative continued to follow up on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed on 23 December 2017. UNOCA provided support to the United Nations Resident Coordinator Office with regard to the implementation of a project funded by the Peacebuilding Fund aimed at contributing to efforts towards sustaining peace in the Pool region. A working-level team undertook a mission to Brazzaville from 15 to 23 September and worked jointly with the United Nations Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa to organize a series of training sessions for members of the police and gendarmerie on the principles of human rights and public order. The mission also met with key political actors to operationalize the permanent political dialogue framework, the Conseil national du dialogue.

Sao Tome and Principe

53. From 16 to 19 August, my Special Representative undertook a mission to Sao Tome and Principe and held consultations with national stakeholders, including the President, Evaristo do Espirito Santo Carvalho, and the Prime Minister, on the political situation in the country and preparations for the legislative, local and regional elections. From 12 to 14 September, UNOCA facilitated a capacity-building workshop for journalists on reporting related to elections, which was jointly organized with the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). From 29 September to 11 October, UNOCA deployed a working-level team to the country to monitor the electoral process in support of the Resident Coordinator. After the elections, my Special Representative visited the country from 14 to 21 October for consultations with political actors.

B. Support to the United Nations, regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security

United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

54. The forty-sixth ministerial meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, for which UNOCA serves as the secretariat, took place in Brazzaville from 29 May to 1 June 2018, with the participation of all ECCAS member States. During its closed-door meeting, the Committee stressed the need for confidence-building measures as an essential tool for conflict prevention that would lead to the adoption of a declaration on confidence-building measures.

55. The ECCAS secretariat provided an extensive briefing on the status of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) in Central Africa during the forty-sixth meeting of the Committee, including the recent validation of a regional action plan. The Committee urged its member States to increase the representation of women in delegations attending the biannual meetings of the Committee in accordance with the Sao Tome declaration (see A/72/363, annex II). The Committee also recommended: (a) setting up an observatory on gender-based violence; (b) conducting a study on women's role in preventing violent extremism; (c) establishing a steering committee to monitor the implementation of the regional

action plan; (d) increasing the number of women within national defence and security forces and United Nations peacekeeping operations; and (e) supporting the HeForShe campaign in Central Africa.

56. From 15 to 18 October, representatives of the Bureau of the Committee (the representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad), as well as the representatives of Cameroon and the Central African Republic, conducted a field mission to Sido, in the Moyen-Chari region of Chad, along the border with the Central African Republic. The forty-seventh ministerial meeting of the Committee is scheduled to take place in N'Djamena on 7 December 2018.

Collaboration with regional, subregional and intergovernmental organizations

57. As a follow-up to the workshop organized by UNOCA and the ECCAS secretariat in Brazzaville in May to validate the regional action plan for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) in Central Africa, UNOCA facilitated a briefing for members of the Government of Gabon, civil society and United Nations entities in Gabon in Libreville on 12 July. A steering committee was established to develop a national action plan for the implementation of Council resolution 1325 (2000) in Gabon.

58. In cooperation with UNESCO and ECCAS, and using extrabudgetary funds from the Department of Political Affairs, UNOCA initiated a study on the state of youth organizations in seven States of Central Africa. The study assessed current national legislation and governmental initiatives as well as opportunities to involve more youth in early warning systems and the fight against violent extremism.

59. On 18 July, my Special Representative attended the sixteenth regional meeting of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Union Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Yaoundé. Participants discussed regional integration and cooperation, peace and security challenges and natural resources while welcoming ongoing efforts to unify ECCAS and CEMAC.

60. UNOCA and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) assisted ECCAS and ECOWAS in convening their joint summit mentioned in paragraph 3 above. In a statement issued on 2 August, I commended the Central and West African subregions on the successful summit and reiterated the commitment of the United Nations to support the implementation of the adopted decisions.

61. With the support of UNOCA, the ECCAS secretariat organized a workshop in Libreville from 30 October to 2 November to enhance the operational capacity of the early warning mechanism for Central Africa. The workshop led to the roll-out of the Africa Reporter software application.

62. In Libreville, from 7 to 9 November, the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, my Special Representative and the ECCAS Secretary-General participated in an expert group meeting on strengthening subregional conflict prevention capabilities in Africa. The meeting resulted in the validation of an assessment undertaken by the Office of the Special Adviser from May to August 2018 to map the existing institutional capacities and gaps of regional economic communities with regard to conflict prevention.

Boko Haram

63. In N'Djamena on 28 and 29 June, UNOCA participated in a technical workshop on the regional stabilization strategy to examine security, humanitarian, socioeconomic, gender and education issues mentioned in paragraph 19 above.

UNOCA continued to support the Lake Chad Basin Commission in the elaboration of its resource mobilization plan for the implementation of the strategy.

64. From 17 to 19 July, UNOCA participated in a regional meeting on the screening and prosecution of persons associated with Boko Haram in N'Djamena. The event was organized by UNODC and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, in close consultation with the African Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). During the meeting, the countries affected by Boko Haram developed coherent approaches on screening and adopted an action checklist to guide the screening efforts.

65. Cameroon is one of the beneficiaries of a project co-implemented by the Office of Counter-Terrorism and OHCHR to train law enforcement officials on human rights, the rule of law and the prevention of terrorism.

66. On 3 and 4 September, my Special Representative participated in the High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region mentioned in paragraph 31 above.

Regional integration

67. On 12 September, UNOCA attended a regional workshop in Libreville on the regional integration strategy paper for Central Africa for 2018–2025 developed by the African Development Bank. The workshop also reviewed a study on sustainable forestry industrialization in the Congo basin countries carried out by the Bank. More than 50 participants, including from CEMAC and ECCAS, recommended the acceleration of the regional integration process in Central Africa and the finalization of the regional integration strategy paper.

Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea

68. The Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security of the Gulf of Guinea in Yaoundé continued to assess the legal frameworks related to the operationalization of the Centre and developed a training syllabus to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Initiated in April with the support of various partners including UNODC, the activities were expected to end in December.

Regional strategy and plan of action on counter-terrorism and the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Central Africa

69. On 6 and 7 September, my Special Representative hosted a meeting in Libreville with the Secretary-General of ECCAS and the Director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa to discuss the joint implementation of the project entitled "Supporting African States towards the vision of 'Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020': capacity-building in Central Africa". The project aims at strengthening national capacities to address the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the Kinshasa Convention. In a joint letter dated 25 September, my Special Representative and the Secretary-General of ECCAS encouraged the four remaining signatories that had not yet ratified the Kinshasa Convention, namely Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Rwanda, to do so.

Coordination of the implementation of the United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the Lord's Resistance Army

70. At the 795th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on 20 September, the United Nations encouraged the Peace and Security Council to review the scope of the African Union Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army, in accordance with the conclusions of the

sixth meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism held on 29 and 30 March 2017 in Addis Ababa. Emphasis was placed on the need for regional and international support for the African Union Regional Task Force, especially in the context of the security vacuum exploited by LRA and other armed groups to intensify criminal activities following the withdrawal of the Uganda People's Defence Forces and the United States Special Forces in June 2017. The African Union Peace and Security Council decided to maintain the Regional Cooperation Initiative, pending the development of a strategy to progressively phase out the Initiative without leaving any security vacuum that LRA could exploit to renew and intensify its destabilization activities in the affected areas. In that regard, the Peace and Security Council requested that the African Union Commission develop an exit strategy for the liquidation of the Initiative that includes realistic timelines and the development of concrete alternatives to the Initiative.

Transhumance and farmer-herder conflicts

71. UNOCA supported subregional initiatives to address growing conflicts between farmers and herders affecting several countries in Central Africa. From 15 to 18 October, the representatives of the Bureau of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa visited Sido, Chad, to assess the security and humanitarian situation in the border area between Chad and the Central African Republic. Following the visit, they formulated recommendations and an action plan to address the issues related to transhumance, including supporting sustained peace in the Central African Republic, the Sudan and the Lake Chad basin, where security issues are linked to transhumance; advocating for the adoption and implementation of transhumance regulations; reinforcing conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms at both the national and regional levels; strengthening the role and participation of women and youth as peacebuilders in both farmer and herder communities; and analysing the relevance of a disarmament programme focused on pastoralists and farmers in the subregion. A new $3 million cross-border project, funded by the Peacebuilding Fund, was approved for implementation by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and IOM. The project is aimed at strengthening dialogue and peacebuilding at the community level for the prevention and management of conflicts between agropastoral communities along the Chad-Central African Republic border, including through strengthening institutional and political dialogue on transhumance dynamics between the two countries.

Link between illicit trafficking in wildlife and natural resources and financing of armed groups in the subregion, including the Lord's Resistance Army and Boko Haram

72. Allegations of illicit trafficking and the financing of armed groups continued. UNOCA participated in technical meetings with ECCAS and UNODC and exchanged views regarding the implementation of a four-year project funded by the European Union aimed at combating illicit trafficking in wildlife and natural resources in the subregion. The project also seeks to increase national capacities and address corruption and money-laundering issues.

C. Enhancing United Nations coherence and coordination in the subregion

73. My Special Representative for Central Africa and my Special Envoy for Burundi, along with representatives of the Department of Political Affairs, attended a meeting in Nairobi organized by my Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region on

29 June. They discussed joint efforts by the United Nations to support the East African Community-led dialogue process in Burundi, in cooperation with the African Union.

74. On 2 July, my Special Representative attended the fifth coordination meeting of the United Nations senior leadership in the Great Lakes region, in Nairobi. Participants reviewed the political and security situations in the region and discussed issues related to coordination within the United Nations.

75. In Libreville on 5 and 6 November, UNOCA organized the first working-level coordination meeting among United Nations entities in Central Africa with the participation of political affairs units, peace and development advisers and experts of other United Nations entities and regional economic communities. The meeting was convened to discuss regional challenges. Its conclusions should, among other things, feed into the preparations for the next meeting of heads of United Nations presences in Central Africa, to be held in 2019.

IV. Observations and recommendations

76. As highlighted in the present report, electoral processes were at the heart of political activity in a number of Central African countries. I encourage the continued efforts of all stakeholders to ensure inclusive and credible electoral processes in their respective countries. It is an important step towards sustaining peace and consolidating stability in the subregion, which has on many occasions witnessed tensions and violence related to contested electoral processes in the past.

77. I am pleased to note that elections took place without major incident in several countries of the subregion. In particular, I congratulate all political stakeholders in Sao Tome and Principe for resolving their differences through dialogue. I also invite all countries in the subregion to arrive at a consensus on contentious issues and build confidence in electoral processes. UNOCA will continue to support such efforts for timely, inclusive, credible and peaceful electoral processes.

78. I welcome the political dialogue processes, with a view to finding lasting solutions to conflicts, that are ongoing in several countries of Central Africa. However, in many countries the situation remains volatile. I encourage ECCAS member States to continue reaching out to all stakeholders to resolve differences peacefully, through inclusive dialogue, in order to build consensus to overcome common challenges. I also appeal to all parties to uphold international human rights and humanitarian obligations and fulfil their commitments. I reiterate the full availability of my Special Representative to continue to work with countries in the subregion towards consolidating stability and preventing further conflict.

79. The regional dimension of the conflict in the Central African Republic and the importance of the subregion in the stabilization of that country should be highlighted once again. In that context, it is important that all regional States continue to play a constructive role and provide coordinated support to the authorities of the Central African Republic and its political process. Engagement will be crucial in the long run, and will last well beyond mediation efforts. The long-term engagement of the subregion in the Central African Republic will lead to greater stability throughout Central Africa.

80. Likewise, it is crucial that all international partners of the Central African Republic continue to remain committed to the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation as the principal framework for the political process in the country. The Initiative continues to enjoy the full support of the United Nations, and my Special Representative for Central Africa will continue to play his subregional role, in

cooperation with my Special Representative for the Central African Republic, in garnering support for the Initiative.

81. I remain deeply concerned by the deteriorating security situation in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon, which has led to displacement, abductions and civilian deaths, as well as casualties among the defence forces and security services. Since it began in November 2016, the crisis has deteriorated and violent episodes have become more frequent. I am also concerned by the deteriorating human rights situation in the two regions. The conduct of legislative and local elections in 2019 in those regions may be a challenge, and the United Nations stands ready to provide support to the Cameroonian authorities as they endeavour to ensure an inclusive and peaceful electoral process through dialogue. I call upon all national stakeholders to work together and to refrain from acts that may aggravate the situation. Solutions to any disputes should be sought through inclusive dialogue.

82. I note with satisfaction the holding of the joint summit of the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS and ECCAS on peace, security, stability and the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in July. The summit illustrates the genuine commitment of the two subregional bodies to working together in the face of common threats to peace and security. The United Nations will continue to work closely with ECCAS and ECOWAS to contribute to the effective implementation of the Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism. I equally encourage other partners to lend support in that regard.

83. I deplore the acts of terrorism and violent extremism which have aggravated the humanitarian crisis in Central Africa and continue to hamper socioeconomic development in the subregion. It is our collective responsibility to redouble our efforts to counter those threats and address their root causes. In that regard, I welcome the recent validation of the African Union and Lake Chad Basin Commission regional strategy for the stabilization, recovery and resilience of the areas of the Lake Chad basin affected by Boko Haram activities, as well as the international assistance pledged by partners in Berlin on 3 and 4 September. I encourage partners to speedily disburse their pledges in view of the urgency of the situation. The United Nations, through my Special Representatives for Central Africa and West Africa and the Sahel, will continue to lend its support to those efforts. I also call on the Multinational Joint Task Force and troop-contributing countries to ensure that all counter-terrorism operations are conducted in full compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

84. I remain concerned by the persistent atrocities committed by LRA in the subregion, and the group's negative impact on the civilian population, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. The group's activities related to poaching and illicit trafficking in wildlife and natural resources, if unaddressed, may inflict irreversible damage to the ecosystem and impede the development of the affected countries. In the long term, the activities have the potential to exacerbate conflict. I therefore welcome the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to maintain the African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army and call upon the African Union as well as international partners to provide renewed support to the mechanism.

85. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the subregion remains one of the main catalysts of the ongoing conflicts, as various armed groups and transnational criminal organizations continue to profit from their trafficking. The recent meeting of State parties to the Kinshasa Convention as well as the decision to establish a secretariat and a trust fund for the implementation of the Convention are important steps towards curbing that plague. It is important for countries that have

yet to ratify the Convention to do so at the earliest opportunity to boost its implementation and facilitate resource mobilization.

86. The past months have witnessed a rise in transhumance-related conflicts in the subregion, aggravated by the impact of climate change. I commend the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa for the field visit to Chad regarding that issue. I invite all concerned to continue working together to address the challenges related to transhumance, including through strengthening border management and regulating cross-border activities. UNOCA will continue to provide its full support to ECCAS and its member States, including within the framework of the implementation of the Lomé Declaration and in close cooperation with UNOWAS.

87. I would like to express my appreciation to the Governments of the region, ECCAS, CEMAC, the African Union, the Gulf of Guinea Commission and other regional and subregional institutions for their continued collaboration with UNOCA. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Multinational Joint Task Force and troop-contributing countries for their dedication and commitment to the service of peace and stability. I am grateful to the Government and people of Gabon for their generous hospitality and support to UNOCA. I would like to thank the various entities of the United Nations system working in Central Africa, including the heads of United Nations peace operations, regional offices, country teams and other entities, for their support to and cooperation with UNOCA.

88. Finally, I would like to thank my Special Representative, François Louncény Fall, and the staff of UNOCA for their continuing support to regional efforts to advance the cause of peace and security in Central Africa.

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General Assembly
Seventy-third session
Agenda item 45
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 29 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I enclose herewith two separate documents detailing the violations of the national airspace of Cyprus and the infringements of international air traffic regulations in the Cyprus flight information region (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports and airports in Cyprus by Turkey (see annex II) during the month of October 2018.

This persistent policy of violating international law and breaching international rules and regulations is a constant threat to international peace and security, has a negative impact on regional stability, jeopardizes the safety of international civil aviation and creates difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus, and prevents the creation of an enabling environment in which to conduct the Cyprus peace process.

Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region via radio calls. During the month of October 2018, the regime installed by the occupying power in the area of Cyprus that it occupies illegally issued one notice to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force. Additionally, Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the airport of Tympou, which continues to operate illegally following the closure by the Cyprus Government of all ports of entry in the areas where it does not exercise effective control.

The said actions of Turkey, which had continued to occupy the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus since 1974, are clearly aimed at undermining Cyprus' sovereignty, consolidating the ongoing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In this respect, I would like to underline that there is only one Cypriot State, which is the Republic of Cyprus, as stipulated in various Security Council resolutions (in particular resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)), in which the Council declared legally invalid the purported secession of part of Cyprus.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of Cyprus by Turkey, as well as the

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infringements by the latter of international air traffic regulations, and appeal for their immediate cessation.

The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for all States to respect Security Council resolutions and adhere to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, I would like to urge Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community to contribute to a meaningful resumption of the peace process, instead of focusing on undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and promoting Cyprus' partition through the creation of facts on the ground and the consolidation of the status quo, including by seeking to politically upgrade the secessionist entity.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 45, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kornelios **Korneliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 29 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 October	1027–1135	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC).
	1054–1155	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1118–1137	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1330–1745	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
2 October	1508–1712	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
3 October	0902–1113	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0945–1141	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1004–1142	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1144–1248	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
4 October	1029–1118	Three F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1314–1525	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1506–1617	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1512–1539	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1531–1621	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
5 October	0725–0755	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1002–1234	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1305–1440	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1450–1535	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
6 October	1013–1057	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1417–1450	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
8 October	1045–1243	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
10 October	1040–1249	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1620–1703	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1635–1724	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
11 October	1024–1644	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1051–1150	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1356–1432	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1539–1734	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
12 October	0905–1100	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1050–1238	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1547–1744	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
14 October	0418–0443	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1800–1835	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1955–2023	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
15 October	0944–1005	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1706–1713	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
17 October	0858–1119	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1118–1228	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1151–1214	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1221–1236	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1715–1735	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
18 October	1011–1122	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1141–1205	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2019–2100	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
21 October	2249–2323	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
22 October	1017–1044	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1207–1228	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1659–1719	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
23 October	1007–1022	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1019–1039	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1211–1225	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1217–1235	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1328–1342	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1345–1402	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1654–1738	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
24 October	0900–1028	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1026–1050	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1317–1335	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1355–1445	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1428–1631	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1512–1550	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1653–1743	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
25 October	1415–1645	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
26 October	1036–1158	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1118–1145	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1328–1537	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1419–1424	Four F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1546–1607	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1737–2007	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
27 October	1240–1429	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
28 October	0750–0844	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0932–1128	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
29 October	1318–1508	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
30 October	0942–1224	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1538–1700	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
31 October	0842–1116	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0929–1634	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1005–1250	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Annex II to the letter dated 29 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
1–2 October	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
4–9 October	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8–13 October	One A-580 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
9–14 October	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
14–18 October	One A-349 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
16–17 October	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
22–23 October	One NL-125 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
23–25 October	One A-1600 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
24–31 October	One P-349 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
30–31 October	One L-402 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
30–31 October	One NL-125 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
30–31 October	One F-503 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
31 October	One P-349 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.

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Letter dated 29 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to attach herewith the concluding statement of the meeting of the ministers for foreign affairs of Libya's neighbouring States, held in Khartoum on 29 November 2018 (see annex).

Having brought this matter to your attention, I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Magdi Ahmed Mofadal **Elnour**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 29 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Concluding statement of the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Libya's neighbouring States, held in Khartoum on 29 November 2018

1. On 29 November 2018, at the kind invitation of His Excellency Mr. Al Dirdiri Mohamed Ahmed Al Dikhairi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Libya's neighbouring States held a meeting in Khartoum, attended by the following: His Excellency Mr. Mohamed T. H. Siala, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Libya; His Excellency Mr. Sameh Hassan Shokry Selim, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt; His Excellency Mr. Sabri Bash Tabaji, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia; Mr. Naamoun Abdelmajid, Chef de Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria; Mr. Saleh Hamid Heguera, Ambassador of the Republic of Chad in Khartoum; and Mr. Agada Garba, Consul General of Niger in Khartoum.

2. Also present at the meeting were Mr. Ghassan Salamé, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Libya; Ms. Amira El-Fadil, Special Envoy of the African Union Commission to Libya; and Ambassador Salah El Din Elgamaly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States for Libya.

3. At the beginning of the opening session, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan welcomed the participants, and explained the current conditions in Libya that had required the meeting to be convened at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs Libya's neighbouring countries, with a view to bringing about peace and stability in Libya.

4. The Ministers heard a presentation on conditions in Libya by Mr. Ghassan Salamé, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Libya. The presentation touched on some positive developments, such as renewed political activity, including reforms in the Government of National Accord and recent significant activity in the House of Representatives. The Ministers affirmed that a lasting solution to the crisis in this brotherly country could be achieved only through the political option chosen by the Libyans themselves. They stressed the need for a unified initiative under the auspices of the United Nations that reflected their wishes and priorities. Those present expressed full support for the plan of the Special Representative of the United Nations, including his recent briefing to the Security Council.

5. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to support Libya in its peaceful political transition based on consensual implementation of the Political Agreement aimed at achieving national reconciliation and the establishment of unified, robust and credible institutions for all Libyans. They stressed the following established principles:

- Maintaining the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya;
- Honouring the Political Agreement of 17 December 2015 as a framework for resolving the crisis and pushing for its implementation by Libyans themselves on the basis of adherence to the political option;
- Rejection of any external interference in the internal affairs of Libya;

- Establishment of the principle of consensus without exclusion or marginalization, a commitment to inclusive dialogue and prioritizing national reconciliation, and rejection of any military solutions.
- Encouraging dialogue of Libyans among themselves.
- Devoting the utmost attention to the south of Libya, and calling for effective coordination among regional States to fight terrorism, violence and criminal activities.

6. The Ministers commended the onset of improved security conditions in the capital, Tripoli, and also welcomed economic measures that had begun to bear fruit. They stressed the need to press on with the security and economic reforms being undertaken by the Government of National Accord, and to ensure the holding of elections and the end of the transitional phase.

7. The Ministers stressed the importance of addressing the grave situation in the south of Libya. They commended the efforts undertaken by Libya's neighbouring States Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia under their triangular initiative, as well as efforts by the Quartet consisting of the Sudan, Libya, Chad and the Niger to secure their common borders with Libya. They affirmed their support for the efforts and mechanisms stemming from the quadripartite agreement on the security of common borders signed on 31 May 2018 in the Chadian capital N'Djamena.

8. The Ministers reiterated their support for the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord established by the Libyan Political Agreement. They welcomed all initiatives undertaken to bring together the Libyan civilian and military leaderships with a view to realizing national unity and finding a way out of the Libyan crisis, including efforts to unify the military institution.

9. It was agreed to hold the next ministerial meeting within at most six months in a neighbouring State to be decided upon through mutual consultation.

10. The Ministers expressed their gratitude to the Government of the Sudan for hosting the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Libya's neighbouring States in Khartoum.

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Security Council

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30 November 2018

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Letter dated 28 November 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to the request of the Security Council in its resolution 2409 (2018), I have the honour to submit the 30-day update, covering the period from 27 October to 26 November 2018, on political and technical progress towards the holding of elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 23 December 2018 and on obstacles to the implementation of the political agreement of 31 December 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Annex

Update of the Secretary-General on progress in the electoral process and the implementation of the political agreement of 31 December 2016 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 26 November 2018

1. The present update, which covers developments from 27 October to 26 November 2018, is submitted pursuant to resolution 2409 (2018), in which the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a written update every 30 days on political and technical progress towards the holding of elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 23 December 2018 and on obstacles to the implementation of the political agreement of 31 December 2016.

I. Key political developments related to the electoral process and the implementation of the political agreement

2. Political developments were characterized by continued progress in electoral preparations.

3. The Front commun pour le Congo platform held a major rally in Kinshasa on 27 October to present its presidential candidate, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary. On 3 November, the Front commun pour le Congo presented its campaign team, comprising several political, cultural, sports and religious figures, including the current Prime Minister, Bruno Tshibala, the Vice Prime Minister in charge of the Interior and Security, Henri Mova Sakanyi, and the Minister of Communication and Media and Spokesperson of the Government, Lambert Mende. On 14 November, nine presidential candidates and leaders of the opposition, including Adolphe Muzito, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Marie-Josée Ifoku, Martin Fayulu and Moïse Katumbi, signed a joint declaration petitioning the Independent National Electoral Commission to invalidate the presidential candidacy of Mr. Ramazani Shadary as the candidate of the Front commun pour le Congo platform for the alleged misuse of State resources in support of the platform. Senior members of the ruling majority rejected the allegations, noting that the resources of the Front commun pour le Congo were drawn from political parties and individuals supporting the platform.

4. The opposition pursued its efforts to agree on a common position on the use of voting machines and on the voter register, and to rally behind a single presidential candidate. In a joint statement of 2 November, 13 prominent members of the opposition, including Freddy Matungulu, Marie-Josée Ifoku, Martin Fayulu, Théodore Ngoy, Vital Kamerhe and other presidential candidates, reiterated their calls upon the Independent National Electoral Commission to reconsider the decision on the use of voting machines and to review the voter register. However, divergences emerged between opposition parties regarding the use of voting machines, with the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social stating its intention to take part in the elections "with or without the voting machines" to avoid further delays in holding the elections. The Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social also did not participate in demonstrations against the use of voting machines and regarding the voter register that were organized across the country on 26 October. In response, Olivier Kamitatu, the Chief of Staff under Moïse Katumbi of the Ensemble pour le changement platform, and other key opposition figures urged opposition parties to refrain from actions that could "break the unity of the political opposition".

5. Against this background, on 11 November, in Geneva, opposition leaders Adolphe Muzito, Félix Tshisekedi, Freddy Matungulu, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Martin

Fayulu, Moïse Katumbi and Vital Kamerhe signed an agreement forming a new coalition named "Lamuka". The coalition issued a declaration designating Martin Fayulu as its common presidential candidate and affirming its intention to participate in the 23 December elections, while rejecting the use of voting machines, demanding a purge of the voter register and the implementation of confidence-building measures for transparent, inclusive, credible and peaceful elections. On 12 November, however, Mr. Tshisekedi and Mr. Kamerhe, citing the discontent expressed by their respective political parties at the choice of Mr. Fayulu as the common candidate, pulled out of the agreement. Mr. Fayulu returned to Kinshasa on 21 November and was welcomed by hundreds of the coalition's supporters. Meanwhile, civil society and faith-based organizations continued to play an active role in the electoral process and used their positions to promote consensus. Following a joint statement on 30 October by civil society organizations, on 6 November the Comité laïc de coordination called for a consensus to overcome the persistent divergences over the electoral process. The message was echoed by the new Archbishop of Kinshasa, Fridolin Ambongo, who opined that the use of the voting machines "should not block the electoral process" and called for tripartite consultations between the opposition, the presidential majority and the Independent National Electoral Commission to find a compromise. There was no meeting between the 21 presidential candidates and the Commission during the reporting period. Meanwhile, on 22 November, the 41-member Catholic Bishops Conference concluded its three-day extraordinary plenary assembly in Kinshasa by issuing a message, signed by the 41 archbishops and bishops, in which it noted the determination of the Commission to organize the combined presidential, national legislative and provincial elections on 23 December 2018 and urged the Congolese people to use the occasion to exercise their sovereign right as masters of their destiny to choose leadership capable of addressing their well-being.

6. On 22 November, the official one-month electoral campaign period started in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The campaign will end on 21 December 2018. The President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila, launched the campaign of Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, presidential candidate of the Front commun pour le Congo, at President Kabila's private farm in Kingakati, near Kinshasa. The event was attended by key members of the Front commun pour le Congo platform. Similarly, the platform's electoral campaign activities reportedly started in Bukavu (South Kivu), Kalemie (Tanganyika), Lubumbashi (Haut-Katanga), Kolwezi (Lualaba), Goma (North Kivu) and Kisangani (Tshopo). At the same time, a low-key launch of the opposition's campaign was noted across the country. On 23 November, in Nairobi, the leaders of the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social and the Union pour la nation congolaise, Felix Tshisekedi and Vital Kamerhe, announced that they had agreed on a coalition to take part in the coming elections, with Mr. Tshisekedi as the presidential flag-bearer. They further announced that they would be returning to Kinshasa on 27 November.

II. Key electoral developments related to the implementation of the political agreement

A. Electoral developments

7. Preparations for the 23 December 2018 elections continued to achieve major milestones. On 31 October, President Kabila chaired a meeting attended by senior Government officials, the President of the Independent National Electoral Commission, Corneille Nangaa, and my Special Representative, Leila Zerrougui, to review progress in the electoral process. At the meeting, the Government announced that $322.2 million of the $432 million budgeted for elections, had been disbursed to

the Commission. On the same day, the Minister of Communication and Media and Spokesperson of the Government, Lambert Mende, inaugurated a new radio station operated by the Commission to raise awareness of the electoral process.

8. On 29 October, at ceremonies held in Kinshasa, the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior and Security, Henri Mova Sakanyi, announced the handover of 150 trucks, 171 pickups, 20 aircraft and 1,800 motorcycles to the President of the Independent National Electoral Commission for the distribution of electoral materials throughout the country. According to the Commission, as at 12 November, most of the electoral materials and 38 per cent of the 105,257 expected voting machines were in the country, with the remainder of the voting machines having arrived at the ports of Mombasa, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania.

9. During the reporting period, the Independent National Electoral Commission continued to train up to 500,000 electoral staff for the conduct of the polls at the 75,563 polling stations. The Commission also intensified civic and voter education and held outreach events on the use of the voting machines. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) supported the work of the Commission to ensure that most recommendations made by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy regarding the use of voting machines were implemented and helped to identify alternative measures when needed. The Commission stated that 15 out of 18 recommendations had been implemented and that the outstanding recommendations were being addressed. On 21 November, the President of the Commission disclosed that, as at that date, the Commission had deployed 70 per cent of electoral kits and materials to their final destinations and that the remaining 30 per cent would reach their destinations by 7 December 2018 at the latest.

10. Regarding the security arrangements for presidential candidates, the Congolese National Police announced on 2 November that 25 agents would be allocated to each of the 21 presidential candidates for their protection, as stipulated by the electoral law.

11. In the meantime, the United Nations police continued to provide training and refresher training sessions for agents of the Congolese National Police throughout the country. As at 9 November, 2,163 police officers, including 281 women, had attended those sessions. The United Nations police also conducted sensitization activities on the role of security forces during elections, targeting 675 police officers, including 51 women. At the same time, the MONUSCO force carried out tabletop exercises in collaboration with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

12. National civil society organizations announced plans to deploy tens of thousands of long- and short-term observers to enhance the transparency and credibility of the process. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) also indicated that it would send an electoral observation mission, which is expected to arrive in early December. Meanwhile, on 8 November, the Independent National Electoral Commission began the accreditation process for witnesses of political parties, electoral observers and journalists.

13. On 3 November, an SADC Electoral Advisory Council mission travelled to Kinshasa, where it met with representatives of the Independent National Electoral Commission, the National Council for Monitoring the Agreement and the Electoral Process and the Government, including with President Kabila and the Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Léonard She Okitundu, who gave assurances that the polls would be held in conformity with international standards and SADC principles. The African Union also received an official invitation from the Commission to dispatch electoral observers.

14. In view of the Ebola outbreak and related concerns, the Ministry of Health and the Independent National Electoral Commission are implementing measures to ensure that elections can take place in the affected areas.

B. Restrictions on political space and violence related to the implementation of the political agreement in the electoral context

15. On 26 October, nationwide demonstrations were organized by opposition parties to protest the use of voting machines and voter registration. The demonstrations passed peacefully, but at least 51 people, including at least 5 women, were arrested and subsequently released. Demonstrations were held in nine cities, including Kinshasa and Goma, but they were banned by the authorities in seven others, mainly for security reasons or as a result of the general ban on demonstrations.

16. New instances of restrictions of democratic space were documented, including with regard to the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, while authorizations for legitimate political activities continued to be granted selectively. Among other locations, restrictions of democratic space were noted in Haut-Katanga province, where members of the Union nationale des fédéralistes du Congo opposition party were arbitrarily arrested by agents of the Congolese National Police on 2 November while returning from a political meeting. On 13 November, in Kinshasa, 10 activists of the Mouvement Lumumbiste Progressiste political party were beaten and arbitrarily arrested by elements of the Republican Guard. On 18 November, 17 members of the Vigilance citoyenne citizens' movement were released on bail following their arrest on 1 November by agents of the Congolese National Police during a sensitization campaign on the monitoring of the electoral process. They were later transferred to the central prison of Makala, in Kinshasa, and charged with incitement to civil disobedience.

C. Confidence-building measures

17. There was no meaningful progress in the implementation of the confidence-building measures envisaged in the political agreement of 31 December 2016. In a communiqué dated 30 October, the Association congolaise pour l'accès à la justice and other stakeholders deplored the non-implementation of the political agreement and called for the release of political prisoners, including emblematic cases. In a related development, on 7 November, the new Archbishop of Kinshasa, Fridolin Ambongo, observed that no progress had been made in the emblematic cases, including those of Eugène Diomi Ndongala and Jean-Claude Muyambo. The Government, however, continued to claim that no political prisoners remained in custody and asserted that some political actors were serving sentences for crimes for which they had been convicted. According to the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, at least 130 political prisoners remained in detention, including civil society activists and human rights defenders. On 3 November, the Minister of Communication and Media and Spokesperson of the Government stated that none of the prisoners in the emblematic cases would be released, as they are not referred to in the political agreement of 31 December 2016. On 21 November, the National Council for Monitoring the Agreement and the Electoral Process issued a statement in which it, inter alia, urged the Government to pursue efforts to fully implement the confidence-building measures provided for in the political agreement, including what it referred to as political prisoners, prisoners of opinion and amnestied prisoners, as well as members of citizens' movements. The statement also called on the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication to ensure equal access to public media by presidential candidates. Despite assurances made by the Independent

National Electoral Commission in early October to engage relevant authorities in ensuring equal coverage of all candidates on public television, such steps have yet to take place.

III. Good offices efforts for the implementation of the political agreement

18. In pursuit of her good offices mandate, my Special Representative met President Kabila and travelled to Zambia in early November to meet President Lungu in his capacity as current Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. Discussions revolved around the security situation in the current electoral context and other issues of common interest. In the same vein, she pursued consultations with key presidential candidates, met the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smaïl Chergui, who visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 8 to 10 November, and discussed the forthcoming deployment of electoral observers with the SADC Electoral Advisory Council. Representatives of MONUSCO also met the Ministers of Justice and Human Rights to advocate the implementation of confidence-building measures.

IV. Observations

19. I welcome the continuing progress in the implementation of the electoral calendar and the constructive engagement of all national stakeholders in the process. I note that, in the majority of cases, the opposition political parties have been able to hold activities in major cities in a peaceful manner. I welcome this opening of political space as well as the professional conduct of the security services and urge the continuation of such progress.

20. In a similar vein, I welcome the preparations made by national and international partners to observe the electoral process. I am encouraged by the commitment of national actors to deploy observers throughout the country, and I am pleased to note the related engagement of SADC and the African Union. I call on the authorities to facilitate the prompt deployment of all observation missions with a view to enhancing the transparency of the process.

21. However, authorizations for legitimate political activities continue to be granted on a selective basis, and instances of intimidation of political activists, journalists and human rights defenders persist. I thus reiterate my call on the national authorities to uphold the rights of the population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to exercise their freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly in line with the Constitution and existing legislation. Similarly, I urge the authorities to enable access to public media for all political actors, with a view to creating a conducive environment for credible and peaceful elections.

22. I also remain concerned by the level of distrust expressed by civil society and opposition actors with regard to key elements of the electoral process, notably in relation to the voting machines and the voter register, and regret that the technical consultations between the Independent National Electoral Commission and presidential candidates have not advanced. I firmly believe that common ground can be found through dialogue and urge all national stakeholders to put partisan interests aside and work towards promoting consensus. Specifically, I call upon the Commission to take further action with a view to dispelling doubts about the integrity of the polling and results tabulation processes.

23. As the electoral process reaches its critical final phase and the electoral campaigns have commenced, trust in the fairness and credibility of the process is a key prerequisite for the acceptance of the results by political actors, civil society and the public. A contested election outcome could undermine the trajectory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in consolidating peace and democratic governance and carry significant regional ramifications. There is still scope for meaningful action to build confidence in line with the provisions of the political agreement of 31 December 2016, which would contribute significantly to the credibility of elections and thereby reduce the potential for post-electoral violence. Positive steps in this direction would require sufficient political space for the unfolding of election campaigns, equal access to media for all candidates and a consistent application of measures to permit the peaceful political demonstrations that have taken place in many key cities to continue throughout the country.

24. I call upon national stakeholders to seize this opportunity to bring the process to a fruitful conclusion in line with the genuine aspirations of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to choose their leaders in credible, transparent and peaceful elections, culminating in a peaceful and democratic transfer of power. I encourage regional and international actors to continue to support the political and electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to remain engaged in the post-electoral period. I reiterate the readiness of the United Nations to provide technical and logistical support to the organization of the polls and to accompany the people of the country at this historic juncture.